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Sovereign debt crises occur regularly and often violently . The recent debt crisis in Greece al-most led to the collapse of the Euro . Yet there 
is no legally and politically recognized procedure 
for restructuring the debt of bankrupt sovereigns . 
Procedures of this type have been periodically de-
bated—most recently, about a decade ago, when 
IMF management proposed a global sovereign 
debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) . They have 
so far been rejected . Countries have been reluctant 
to give up power to supranational rules or insti-
tutions . Creditors and debtors have felt that there 
were sufficient instruments for addressing debt 
crises at hoc . Importantly, there were also fears 
that making debt easier to restructure would raise 
the costs and reduce the amounts of sovereign 
borrowing in many countries . This was perceived 
to be against the interests of both the providers of 
both creditors and major borrowers .
This year’s CIEPR report argues that both the 
nature and our understanding of sovereign debt 
problems have changed in ways that create a much 
stronger case for an orderly sovereign bankruptcy 
regime today than ten years ago .
• Pre-crisis policy mistakes—and in par-
ticular, the tendency of domestic policy-
makers to overborrow or pay too little at-
tention to private debt accumulation that 
might turn public—are now recognized to 
be a much more severe problem for bor-
rowing countries than the costs or limited 
availability of private financing . Far from 
being a problem, proposals that would 
limit the ability to borrow for countries 
with poor policies are a good thing .
• Recent court rulings—particularly a recent 
U .S . ruling that gives “holdout creditors” 
that decline a restructuring offer the right 
to interfere with payments to the creditors 
that accept such an offer . This will compli-
cate efforts to resolve future debt crises on 
an ad hoc basis .
• Sovereign debt crises are no longer just a 
problem in emerging markets, but a core 
concern in advanced countries as well— 
particularly in the Euro area . If the Euro 
is to survive, this will require both better 
ways to resolve debt crises and stronger, 
market-based incentives that prevent debt 
problems from occurring in the first place .
To address these problems, the report presents 
policy proposals at two levels: for the Euro area, 
and globally . 
The Euro area differs from other integrated re-
gions both in that its members have fewer in-
struments to deal with debt crises—they cannot 
devalue or inflate—and because a crisis in one 
member can have catastrophic consequences for 
others (by threatening the common currency) . 
This requires both a mechanism for the orderly 
resolution of debt crises and stronger incentives to 
prevent them . The current financial architecture in 
the Euro area is inadequate in this respect, because 
its main pillar—the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM)—is not set up to deal with unsustainable 
debt . If it is used even when there are significant 
concerns about the ability of borrowers to repay 
their debts, it will become source of transfers, rath-
er than just crisis lending . 
These problems could be addressed via an amend-
ment of the ESM treaty that encourages and legiti-
mizes—both legally and politically—debt restruc-
turing in unsustainable debt cases . 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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• First, assets and revenues of countries 
undertaking a debt restructuring would 
be deemed immune from legal action by 
holdouts if a restructuring is approved by 
the ESM . 
• Second, the treaty would require a debt re-
structuring as a condition for ESM lending 
when national debts exceed a pre-set level . 
This should be higher than the Maastricht 
limit of 60 percent of GDP, but not so high 
as to render the constraint meaningless . In 
the Euro area, this may mean a level about 
1 ½  times the Maastricht limit . The pres-
ence of such a debt threshold would help 
differentiate borrowing costs in normal 
times based on the strength of economic 
policies . At the same time, it would pro-
tect ESM resources and Euro area taxpay-
ers, and prevent extreme adjustments of 
public finances at the expense of citizens 
who usually have little control over poli-
cy mistakes leading to excessive sovereign 
debt .
Importantly, Euro area countries must be given a 
chance to deal with legacy debt before this regime 
is introduced . For countries significantly above 
the future upper debt threshold, this will require 
a judgment of whether debt can be reduced below 
the limit within a reasonable time frame . Where 
the answer is no, the Euro area needs to make a 
choice between an upfront restructuring – backed 
by the ESM – and extra support, for example, in 
the form of providing a joint and several guarantee 
on new debt issuance as long as countries adhere 
to an agreed fiscal consolidation path .
At the global level, the relatively small size of the 
IMF, its de facto priority and its track record in 
getting repaid make it less likely that crisis lend-
ing will turn into transfers .  However, experience 
shows that incentives are stacked against the 
timely recognition and restructuring of unsus-
tainable debts . Recent court rulings encouraging 
holdouts, discouraging creditor participation in 
debt exchange offers, and bringing into question 
the IMF’s priority status, will make this problem 
worse . To address this without allowing sovereigns 
to frivolously repudiate their debts, two alternative 
mechanisms are proposed . 
• A coordinated introduction of a strong 
form of “collective action clauses” in sov-
ereign bond contract, namely, provisions 
that allow for the restructuring of bonded 
debt with the agreement of a supermajori-
ty of creditors across all bonds . 
• The creation of a Sovereign Debt Adjust-
ment Facility by the International Mon-
etary Fund, which would combine IMF 
lending with debt restructuring . A set 
of clearly defined ex ante criteria, analo-
gous to those used in the HIPC initiative, 
would need to be developed to steer high 
debt countries towards this facility . An 
amendment of the IMF articles would en-
sure that the assets of countries using this 
facility would be shielded from holdouts 
if a supermajority of creditors agrees to a 
restructuring . 
The main difference between the two proposals is 
that the second would do more to correct biases 
that delay necessary debt restructuring . Further-
more, while both would deal with the holdout 
problem in the long run, the IMF-based proposal 
would have immediate effects, while better collec-
tive action clauses would become effective only 
gradually, as existing debt is replaced by newly is-
sued debt .
The world is currently less equipped to handle 
problems of unsustainable debt than at any time 
since the 1930s . At the same time, the extent of 
these problems has grown . Reform proposals that 
could address them have become more mature and 
more targeted, and arguments that led to the rejec-
tion of analogous proposals 10 years ago no longer 
apply . It is time for policy makers to tackle the cen-
tral problems head on . 
R EVIS ITI nG SoVE R E IG n BAn kR U PTCY  
1
Sovereign debt crises tend to trigger calls for sovereign bankruptcy . In the postwar era, a first round of such calls coincided with the 
great Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s . A 
second round accompanied the post-Brady debt 
crises, beginning with the 1995 Mexican crisis and 
particularly Russia’s 1998 default, and leading to 
the International Monetary Fund’s 2001 proposal 
for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM), which was intensely debated and finally 
rejected by IMF shareholders in April 2003 .1 Since 
2010, calls for some form of international sover-
eign bankruptcy regime have returned .2 These 
have been motivated partly by events in Europe, 
but also by difficulties in restructuring stubbornly 
high debt levels in other parts of the world, such as 
the Caribbean Sea Basin, and by ongoing litigation 
that could make such restructurings even harder .
This report revisits the case for a sovereign bank-
ruptcy regime, understood as a mix of national and 
international institutions that would, in some con-
ditions, sanction a comprehensive modification of 
sovereign debt contracts, and extend legal protec-
tions to the sovereigns and creditors involved . It 
formulates the economic trade-offs involved with 
creating such a regime, explains why and under 
what conditions the regime could improve welfare, 
and presents options for implementing the regime . 
Its main conclusion is that the intellectual case 
for—and feasibility of—a sovereign debt workout 
mechanism based on some combination of nation-
al statutes and international treaty is much stron-
ger now than it was 10 or 20 years ago . This is es-
pecially true for the euro zone, where the case for 
such a regime is particularly strong and its imple-
mentation as a complement to the existing Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism would be comparatively 
straightforward .
As background for the logical structure of this re-
port, it is useful to briefly recall the SDRM discus-
sions of the early 2000s . The main focus of this de-
bate was the perceived trade-off between ex-post 
and ex-ante efficiency . SDRM proponents based 
their proposal on ex-post inefficiency, exemplified 
by the successes or near-misses of holdout cred-
itors in cases against Brazil and Peru .3 The argu-
ment was that if creditors could expect holdout 
strategies to pay off, free riding would become 
1 For a survey, see Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002) .
2  See, e .g ., Gianviti et al (2010), Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2010); EEAG (2011); Bogdandy and Goldmann (2012); and Miller and Thomas 
(2013) .
3 Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009); Schumacher, Trebesch, and Enderlein (2012) .
CHAPTER 1: Introduction
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overwhelming, rendering orderly debt restructur-
ings unfeasible . Conversely, SDRM critics focused 
on ex-ante efficiency . They argued that since gov-
ernments could not be easily forced to pay their 
debts, sovereign debt was feasible and affordable 
only because sovereign debt crises were costly . A 
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism whose 
express purpose was to lower the cost of debt crises 
might do more harm than good by lowering incen-
tives to repay and sharply raising the cost of debt . 
In principle, there was a way of balancing the 
trade-off between ex-post costs and ex-ante in-
centives: an SDRM involving a “double trigger”—
namely, the debtor country would be able to make 
a request for assistance (analogous to filing for 
bankruptcy protection), and a bankruptcy court-
like institution could reject frivolous requests . 
However, from the perspective of SDRM critics, 
this solution had two weaknesses . First, private 
creditors might not trust the bankruptcy court—
particularly if it were the IMF, which was viewed as 
both susceptible to political pressure and subject 
to conflicts of interests through its own role as a 
large creditor . Second, perverse incentives created 
by lower crisis costs might extend beyond incen-
tives to repudiate—encompassing a broad range 
of precrisis policies that influenced the chances 
of getting into debt-servicing difficulties . Hence, 
to create good incentives for debtor countries, an 
international bankruptcy court would need to not 
only distinguish between an “ability to pay” and a 
“willingness to pay” crisis but also judge wheth-
er an “ability to pay” crisis were mainly the fault 
of the country or the result of bad luck . This was 
viewed as a tall order for any institution—partic-
ularly those that might not be fully independent, 
and that might be sympathetic to a country’s plight 
regardless of its causes .
The SDRM was rejected in 2003, in part because the 
United States and large emerging market borrow-
ers could not be convinced that its ex-post benefits 
outweighed its ex-ante risks, and partly because 
the ex-post costs of the status quo did not seem 
intractable at the time; most debt crises since the 
mid-1990s had been resolved fairly quickly without 
statutory bankruptcy, and did not lead to litigation 
by holdouts . Those who worried about holdouts, in 
lieu of a treaty change, got market-wide contract re-
form, whereby collective action clauses were intro-
duced in most New York law bonds issued begin-
ning 2003 . This was rationalized as a small step to-
ward a more ex-post efficient resolution, which was 
unlikely to upset markets ex ante (and it did not) .
Since 2003 there have been three developments 
that add to, and might have changed the balance 
of, the set of arguments outlined above . First, re-
search on sovereign debt problems has evolved 
to take a broader and somewhat different view 
of the “ex-ante problem .” As an empirical matter, 
the traditional enforcement problem seems to be 
overshadowed by moral hazard problems of a dif-
ferent kind . Debtor countries have control over 
key factors—their debt levels, debt structure and 
prospects for economic growth—that determine 
their ability to pay . Additional moral hazard prob-
lems may be created at the expense of third parties . 
These problems can result in overborrowing, along 
with delays in seeking unavoidable sovereign debt 
restructurings . The consensus seems to have shift-
ed away from the fear that countries might restruc-
ture opportunistically to the fear that they might 
restructure too late, and that these restructurings 
might not be deep enough . This has fundamental 
implications for the debate on sovereign bankrupt-
cy: If the main problem in sovereign debt is not re-
pudiating debtors and overly tight borrowing con-
straints, but rather overborrowing at the front end 
and procrastination at the back end, then the old 
trade-off between ex-ante and ex-post efficiency 
no longer holds, at least within some range . Low-
ering the costs of debt crises ex post might benefit 
efficiency ex ante . 
Second, the holdout problem has experienced a 
rejuvenation . One of the arguments against the 
SDRM was that it was a heavy-handed way of ad-
dressing a problem—coordination failures in debt 
restructuring—that could be solved easily using 
procedures and legal techniques that debtors could 
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invoke unilaterally . For example, take-it-or-leave-it 
debt exchange offers, backed by minimum partici-
pation thresholds and exit consents, allowed debt-
ors to strip holdouts of enforcement weapons with 
the agreement of a simple majority of bondhold-
ers . However, recent court rulings against Argen-
tina in New York give creditors tools to overcome 
such tactics . At the same time, bond contracts have 
developed to require supermajorities for the most 
powerful exit amendments, which are no longer as 
potent a solution as they were in the restructur-
ings of the early 2000s . Further, investors pursuing 
holdout strategies have become increasingly effec-
tive, as a function of both their financing and their 
legal sophistication . As a result, successful debt re-
structurings have become harder to achieve, even 
if they are in the interests of both the debtor and a 
large majority of creditors .
Third, the important special case of the euro area 
now looms large . This has characteristics that both 
aggravate the ex-ante problem and increase the 
plausibility of a statutory solution . The close eco-
nomic, financial and political linkages inside the 
euro zone—including, perhaps most important, 
the threat that a sovereign default might trigger 
a costly exit from the single currency—make the 
members of the common currency area much less 
willing to risk a failed debt restructuring in their 
midst . On top of this, the lack of monetary and ex-
change rate instruments at the country level makes 
it harder for these members to address growth 
and competitiveness problems without external 
support . For both reasons, the euro zone suffers a 
more severe moral hazard problem than, say, the 
potential moral hazard caused by IMF crisis lend-
ing . This may contribute to mispricing, overbor-
rowing and delays in needed sovereign debt re-
structuring, as occurred in Greece . At the same 
time, because so many areas of economic policy in 
the European Union, and particularly in the euro 
area, are already governed by common statute, a 
statutory approach toward sovereign bankruptcy 
may stand a better chance in the euro area than 
elsewhere .
The remainder of this report follows the structure 
of these three arguments . We begin with a survey 
of shifting views on the pathologies in sovereign 
debt . We next discuss the impact of recent liti-
gation and changes in bond contracts on ad hoc 
debt restructurings . This is followed by a chapter 
that argues why a more systematic approach to 
sovereign debt restructuring might be particular-
ly needed in the euro area . The final chapter pres-
ents a number of proposals that could address the 
problem . These include a proposal to modify the 
2012 treaty establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) to require debt restructuring as 
a condition of ESM assistance in predefined cir-
cumstances, and to immunize the assets of those 
countries that have undergone ESM-sanctioned 
restructurings from attachments by holdout cred-
itors . At the broader international level, the report 
presents and discusses three alternative options—
two that would involve contractual or statutory 
changes in major borrowing jurisdictions, and one 
involving an IMF-based restructuring mechanism . 
The latter envisages endorsement of a sovereign 
debtor’s restructuring proposal by both a majori-
ty of creditors and the IMF . Following this double 
endorsement, the debtor’s assets would become 
immune from attachment in the jurisdictions of 
IMF members .
The report does not discuss two important topics . 
First, because it focuses on sovereign debt, it does 
not deal with how to unwind or prevent excessive 
debts incurred in the private sector .4 However, the 
links between these problems and sovereign debt 
problems are briefly discussed in the context of 
the euro area (chapter 3) . The argument is that 
while the proposals made in this report will not 
by themselves solve private sector debt problems, 
4  Some of these problems, particularly as pertaining to private debt accumulation fueled by international capital flows, were discussed in last 
year’s CIEPR report, Banks and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Regulatory Responses (CIEPR 2012) .
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they may ameliorate them; markets will be more 
likely to “price” sovereign default risks regardless 
of whether these originate from sovereign debt or 
socialized private debt . This should give incentives 
to sovereigns to worry more about credit booms 
that could give rise to quasi-fiscal liabilities . While 
the proposals in this report and plans to create a 
euro area–based Banking Union address different 
problems, these problems are linked, and the pro-
posals should be viewed as complementary .
Second, we do not discuss a class of ideas that have 
broadly similar aims as the proposals in this re-
port, namely, how to prevent sovereign debt crises 
through debt contracts with equity-like features, 
for example, by indexing repayments to gross do-
mestic product (GDP) or commodity prices .5 Al-
though we are sympathetic to these ideas, for the 
purposes of the present report we take it as a given 
that in spite of periodic calls, bonds with these fea-
tures do not play an important role in sovereign fi-
nance, and are unlikely to play such a role anytime 
soon—in part for reasons analyzed in chapter 2 . 
The focus of this report is on mechanisms that are 
plausible today—mechanisms that would allow 
for the swift renegotiation of debt under certain 
conditions, in ways that not only make crises less 
costly but also encourage sovereign debtors and 
creditors to act more responsibly in normal times .
5 See, e .g ., Mody (2013) .
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A key feature distinguishing sovereign debt con-tracts from debt owed by private parties is weaker contract enforcement . In a sovereign 
default, the remedies at the disposal of creditors—
particularly private creditors—are limited by the 
fact that most sovereign assets are located within a 
sovereign’s jurisdiction and cannot be seized, even 
when creditors have won in court (see chapter 3) . 
In spite of this fact, many sovereigns have histori-
cally been able to borrow large amounts of funds .6 
How is this possible? Why would private debtors 
entrust sovereigns with their money when they 
cannot enforce repayment?
Inspired by this puzzle, the modern economic 
literature on sovereign debt, which developed in 
the 1980s, initially focused on understanding why 
sovereign debt ever got repaid . It concluded that 
borrowers repay because defaults are economical-
ly costly for the debtor country .7 Countries will be 
able to borrow up to the point in which the temp-
tation to default is balanced by its costs . In stan-
dard theories of sovereign debt, this level of debt is 
generally below the level at which countries would 
like to be able to borrow . 
It follows that attempts to reduce the costs of de-
fault could also reduce welfare because they would 
make sovereign debt more expensive and lower the 
maximum level of debt that a sovereign can accu-
mulate . Conversely, attempts to improve enforce-
ment could improve welfare even if they make 
debt crises more painful and protracted . This logic 
has led some researchers to warn that proposals 
aimed at reducing the ex-post costs of debt crises 
could backfire .8 It is thus important to also exam-
ine policy proposals in the area of crisis resolution 
from an ex-ante perspective—taking into account 
their likely impact on the sovereign debt market in 
normal times—rather than simply from the per-
spective of whether they will reduce the costs of a 
crisis once this has happened . The present report 
takes this perspective throughout . 
At the same time, it is important to realize that 
in spite of the enforcement problem in sovereign 
CHAPTER 2: Pathologies in Sovereign Debt
6  According to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (April 2013 edition), general government debt in 2012 stood at about 35 percent of GDP on 
average in emerging markets and developing countries and over 100 percent of GDP in advanced countries .
7  The contributions include Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); Sachs and Cohen (1982); and Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b) . For surveys of the 
literature, see Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009); Wright (2011); Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch (2012); Tomz and Wright (2013); 
and Aguiar and Amador (forthcoming) . For evidence on the costs of default, see Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005); Tomz (2007); Borensztein 
and Panizza (2009); Sandleris (2012); Tomz and Wright (2013); and Cruces and Trebesch (2013) .
8 See Dooley (2000) and Shleifer (2003) .
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debt, it is logically possible to make crisis resolu-
tion more efficient without making debtors coun-
tries worse off in normal times . There are two rea-
sons for this:
• Even if there is a trade-off between ex-ante 
incentives to repay and the ex-post costs of 
default, this does not mean that this trade-
off cannot be ameliorated . In principle, it 
could be possible to improve contracts or 
institutions governing sovereign debt in a 
way that reduces crisis costs while main-
taining incentives to repay .
• Furthermore, there could be important 
cases in which there is no trade-off be-
tween reducing the ex-post costs of cri-
ses and improving ex-ante incentives . For 
example, the costs of default could be a 
result of historic institutions or contracts 
that are not optimal in the sense of pro-
viding just the right amount of deterrent 
to stop creditors from repudiating . Or the 
situation might be complicated by incen-
tive problems that go beyond the enforce-
ment problem . Distorted incentives could 
drive a wedge between the maximum that 
a sovereign can borrow—the borrowing 
limit—and what it should be borrowing—
the socially optimal amount of borrowing . 
If this were to be the case, reducing the 
costs of crises might not have any social 
cost ex ante . In fact, for countries that 
“overborrow”—in the sense that actual 
borrowing is above the socially optimal 
amount—tighter borrowing constraints 
would improve welfare .
The first point has been understood since at least 
the late 1980s .9 Suppose that it were possibly to 
write contracts (implicitly or explicitly) or create 
institutions so as to make sovereign defaults costly 
if and only if they cannot be “excused” by shocks 
to fundamentals outside the control of debtor 
countries . That is, repudiations would be severe-
ly punished (and as a result, would never occur), 
while shocks to debt service capacity would lead 
to a corresponding adjustment in the debt burden 
without any punishment . In such a world, costly 
debt crises would never arise, in spite of the pres-
ence of an enforcement problem . 
In the real world, however, debt crises cannot be 
neatly separated into excusable defaults driven 
by fundamentals and inexcusable repudiations . 
Yet there may be institutional or contractual im-
provements—for example, debt contracts that in-
dex repayments to variables such as international 
commodity prices—that reduce the frequency or 
costs of debt crises . The main insight is that costly 
crises are never just a reflection of the enforcement 
problem, but also reflect a combination of the en-
forcement problem with other problems, such as 
imperfect information or incomplete contracts . 
As such, it may be possible to reduce the costs of 
crises through institutions or contracts that legit-
imize debt restructurings in certain circumstanc-
es (which would obviously exclude strategic de-
faults) . This is the flavor of some of the proposals 
made in the final chapter of this report .
The second point is less well understood, is poten-
tially more controversial, and as such is the main 
focus of this chapter . It relates to the existence of 
pathologies in sovereign debt that go beyond weak 
contract enforcement, and the possibility that 
these additional pathologies may be more relevant 
as drivers of actual borrowing behavior . These pa-
thologies include political failures, the moral haz-
ard associated with the presence of international 
bailouts, and a lack of seniority in sovereign debt 
contracts . Together, they could be a source of 
overborrowing and suboptimal public debt man-
agement . Political considerations and inefficient 
contract design may also lead to a situation in 
which, rather than defaulting too much and too 
early, countries default too late and too little . In 
this case, reducing the costs of default will be good 
not only ex post—once a crisis has occurred—but 
9 See Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) .
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also ex ante, by reducing inefficient borrowing in 
normal times and making debt crises less likely .
overborrowing
In standard economic theories of sovereign debt, 
sovereigns are credit-constrained because their 
ability to borrow is capped by a level that depends 
on default costs . The typical situation in these 
models is “underborrowing,” in the sense that debt 
levels are suboptimally low from a social perspec-
tive . Specifically, debt levels are lower than what a 
country would want to borrow in a world where 
debt contracts could be enforced in the same way 
as, for example, corporate debt contracts .
This view of sovereign debt is difficult to reconcile 
with actual borrowing behavior, both across coun-
tries and over time . Figure 1 shows 2012 general 
government debt levels for three groups of coun-
tries that are roughly similar, within each group, 
with respect to per capita income levels and (in the 
case of the two emerging market groups) geogra-
phy and trading partners . Of the countries shown, 
only two (Greece and Jamaica) do not currently 
have access to international capital markets . Of 
course, the fact that a country has access to capital 
markets does not mean that its debt may not be 
primarily determined by its debt limit; these coun-
tries may want to stay somewhat below their max-
imum borrowing in order to have room to respond 
to economic shocks . The question is whether the 
data pattern observed in figure 1 is consistent with 
this notion .
Figure 1 shows that advanced economies tend 
to have higher debt levels than emerging market 
countries .10 This is consistent with the view that 
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Figure 1. general government debt in three groups oF countries, 2012 (percentage oF gdp)
10  This is true not only for the average of advanced countries and emerging markets selected in figure 1 for illustrative purposes but also more 
generally .
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2013 .
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debt levels are determined by repayment prospects; 
advanced countries may be able to borrow in larg-
er amounts because they are institutionally better 
able to commit to debt repayment, or because they 
are less likely to suffer shocks that would put their 
debt levels over the limit where debt restructur-
ing is optimal . However, within the three groups, 
variations in debt levels (even ignoring Greece 
and Jamaica, the two outliers) are so large as to 
be irreconcilable with the view that most of these 
countries are borrowing at or close to their debt 
limits . It is implausible that countries’ differences 
in commitment credibility, the location of their as-
sets, their degree of international integration, their 
dependence on foreign capital or other factors that 
could drive differences in their borrowing limits 
could also explain, for example, why Canadian 
debt is at 86 percent of GDP while Australian debt 
is only 27 percent, why Italy’s debt is 127 percent 
of GDP while that of the Netherlands is only 71 
percent, why debt is only 19 percent of GDP in 
Peru but 45 percent in Argentina and 68 percent 
in Brazil, or why debt stands at 19 percent of GDP 
in Bulgaria but 37 percent in Romania . 
Similar arguments apply over time . Belgium in-
creased its debt level from about 75 percent of 
GDP in 1980 to almost 140 percent in 1993 and 
subsequently reduced it again to 87 percent in 
2007 . Over the same period, the French govern-
ment’s debt more than quadrupled as a share of 
GDP, rising more or less continuously, from about 
20 percent to about 90 percent . Peru halved its 
government debt between 2000 and 2012 . So did 
Sweden . In all these cases, it is difficult to imag-
ine that these swings were the result of tighter or 
laxer sovereign borrowing constraints . It is more 
plausible that most of these countries were far 
from their borrowing limits during most of their 
histories, and that debt levels changed as a result of 
policy choices and economic shocks, which affect-
ed growth and determined the size of government 
deficits and debts . 
If one accepts the fact that for most advanced and 
emerging market economies debt levels are deter-
mined not by the maximum amount that these 
countries can borrow but instead by policy choices 
over time, it is possible, in principle, that countries 
may, from a social perspective, be overborrowing 
rather than underborrowing—that is, they may be 
borrowing beyond the point at which the social 
cost of one additional unit of debt equals the social 
benefit of an additional unit of debt-financed gov-
ernment expenditure . Overborrowing could arise 
from at least three distortions .
First, policymakers often have incentives to bor-
row more than what is socially optimal (for a re-
cent survey, see Eichengreen et al . 2011) . Political 
failures can also lead to debt crises through subop-
timal debt management . Contingent debt instru-
ments with contractual obligations that are linked 
to a country’s ability to pay can help in ensuring 
that a government meets its financing needs and 
payment obligations at the lowest possible cost 
consistent with a prudent degree of risk (Missale 
1999) . However, self-interested politicians have 
limited incentives to issue contingent debt instru-
ments that have upfront costs but may yield bene-
fits for their successors .11
Second, overborrowing might be the result of mor-
al hazard linked to the presence of an international 
lender of last resort . Because countries tend to re-
pay what they borrow from official lenders, there 
is limited empirical evidence for debtor moral haz-
ard at the expenses of global taxpayers . Creditors, 
however, may have incentives to behave recklessly 
and lend without adequate regard to risk because 
official bailout packages may allow for repayments 
that are “too high” with respect to the social op-
timum . The bill is not footed by global taxpayers 
but by local taxpayers who end up repaying, even 
when it would have been better to restructure 
(Jeanne and Zettelmeyer 2001) . Although, in prin-
ciple, moral hazard can be mitigated by designing 
11  While political failures limit the supply of contingent debt instruments, market failures associated with coordination problems limit the 
demand for such instruments . 
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official rescue packages that “bail-in” private cred-
itors, such bail-ins may not be optimal ex post, and 
it may be difficult for official lenders to commit to 
them ex ante . Official packages can also delay the 
moment when a country decides to restructure its 
debts (more is given on this below), making cred-
itors willing to provide short-term finance to risky 
creditors in the hope of being able to collect be-
fore the country defaults or starts the restructuring 
process .
Third, overborrowing could result from the fact 
that, in the absence of seniority rules, new lending 
to high-risk countries dilutes the claims of exist-
ing creditors . Debt dilution can lead to excessive 
debt accumulation because the marginal interest 
rate does not reflect the increase in risk brought 
about the issuance of new debt (Bolton and Jeanne 
2007) . Countries with prudent fiscal policies face 
the opposite problem because the possibility of 
diluting the debt increases the risk of lending to 
these countries . Debt dilution has also an adverse 
effect on debt composition because, in the attempt 
to hold debt that is difficult to dilute, lenders will 
be reluctant to buy long-term securities or lo-
cal currency debt instruments (Borensztein et al . 
2005) .12
Overborrowing requires creditors in the private 
or official sector that agree to provide the needed 
financing . Overborrowing is often facilitated by 
herding behavior, which leads creditors to take on 
too much risk during periods of global optimism .13 
Though most theoretical models of sovereign debt 
suggest that countries should borrow abroad 
during recessions and repay during good times, 
there is evidence that net lending to emerging 
market and developing countries is pro-cyclical, 
with large capital inflows during periods of high 
growth and outflows during recessions (see Paniz-
za, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer 2009, table 2) . 
This is also true for cross-border, bank-intermedi-
ated private credit flows (CIEPR 2012) .
 
In the stereotypical case of overborrowing syn-
drome, economic reforms and financial liberal-
ization are followed by rapid and unsustainable 
capital inflows channeled to the private sector by 
domestic banks and fueled by excessive optimism 
among residents, foreign investors and policymak-
ers (McKinnon and Pill 1996) . A global shock, or 
the realization that the inflows are not sustainable, 
is often followed by a sudden stop (Calvo 2005), 
economic collapse and financial crisis . At this 
point, private sector liabilities are transferred to 
the sovereign, exacerbating the impact of public 
overborrowing during the preceding upswing .
As suggested by figure 1, in the advanced econ-
omies, the credit constraints associated with en-
forcement problems are unlikely to be binding at 
levels that are sufficiently low to rule out overbor-
rowing . Many advanced economies have been able 
to accumulate large public debts, and, until recent-
ly, there was no strong relationship between debt 
levels and the borrowing costs faced by this group 
of countries . This remains true for the advanced 
economies that do not belong to the euro area (see 
chapter 4) .14
In emerging market countries, debt ratios tend to 
be lower, and the correlation between borrowing 
costs and fundamentals is tighter than in the ad-
vanced economies . Low debt ratios are consistent 
with the presence of credit constraints associat-
ed with limited enforcement . However, a limited 
ability and willingness to borrow may also be due 
to the fact that emerging market countries have 
weaker institutions (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savas-
tano 2003), have riskier debt structures (Eichen-
green et al . 2005), and face larger external financial 
shocks (Calvo 2005) . 
12 Dilution accounts for more than 80 percent of the default risk in the baseline calibrated model of Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sosa Padilla (2012) .
13  In the presence of rational herding, investors disregard fundamentals and stand ready to either lend at will when everybody else is lending or to 
liquidate good credits when everybody else is also selling (see Allen, Morris, and Shin 2006) .
14 For an econometric analysis, see Dell’Erba, Hausmann, and Panizza (2013) . 
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Although emerging market countries do face 
precarious access to credit, the presence of gen-
eralized capital flows bonanzas and sudden stops 
suggests that global factors may be a more im-
portant determinant of credit constraints than 
country-specific considerations linked to capaci-
ty and willingness to pay (Calvo, Leiderman, and 
Reinhart 1993; González-Rozada and Levy Yeyati 
2008) . For instance, in a context of historically low 
interest rates, investors have been willing to take 
greater risks to achieve returns . This “search for 
yield” allowed low-rated frontier markets to issue 
international bonds with low spreads compared 
with higher-rated instruments issued by tradition-
al borrowers (table 1) . 
Restructuring Too Late
There is evidence that policymakers are often re-
luctant to restructure their debts and suboptimally 
postpone unavoidable defaults (e .g ., Borensztein 
and Panizza 2009; Levy Yeyati and Panizza 2010; 
IMF 2013) . Delayed defaults can lead to the de-
struction of value because a prolonged predefault 
crisis may reduce a country’s capacity and willing-
ness to pay . Its capacity to pay is reduced because 
procrastination prolongs the climate of uncertain-
ty, high interest rates and restrictive fiscal policies 
that are ineffective in avoiding default but amplify 
output contractions . Delayed defaults reduce its 
willingness to pay because electors that have suf-
fered long periods of economic austerity are less 
likely to support a creditor-friendly debt restruc-
turing . 
Because policymakers are often replaced after a 
debt default (figure 2), late restructurings may be 
caused by self-interested agents that have incen-
tives to gamble for redemption, even when delays 
entail economic costs for society as a whole . My-
opic policymakers who do not take into account 
the long-run costs of excessive debt accumulation 
may also decide to delay a default in order to have 
continuous access to external resources . Short po-
litical horizons may also create incentives to un-
dertake policies that increase the vulnerability of 
the financial sector to government default . This 
generates short-term benefits in terms of a high-
er capacity to borrow, but at the expense of higher 
future default costs if the accumulated debt turns 
out to be unsustainable (Acharya and Rajan 2013) . 
table 1. selected bond issuances in Frontier markets
Country Date
Amount  
(millions of dollars) Currency
Yield  
(basis points)
Maturity 
(years)
Rating 
(S&Pa)
Angola 08/2012 1,000 dollar 700 7 BB-
Bolivia 10/2012 500 dollar 490 10 BB–
Honduras 04/2013 500 dollar 750 10 B+
Mongolia 11/2012 1,000 dollar 512 10 BB–
Mongolia 11/2012 500 dollar 412 5 BB–
Paraguay 01/2013 500 dollar 460 10 BB–
Rwanda 04/2013 400 euro 660 10 B
Tanzania 02/2013 600 dollar LIBoRb + 600 7 nR
Zambia 10/2012 750 dollar 560 10 B+
Memo:
Investment-grade  
U.S. corporatesc
2011–13 dollar 450 10–15
aStandard & Poor’s .
bLondon Interbank Offered Rate .
cBofA Merrill Lynch U .S . corporate 10–15 year effective yield .
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Alternatively, policymakers who believe that “stra-
tegic” defaults can have large reputational costs 
but that “unavoidable” defaults carry limited costs 
in terms of reputation may decide to postpone a 
needed default in order to signal that the default 
is indeed unavoidable. Finally, policymakers may 
delay necessary defaults because, in the absence 
of a clear mechanism to manage the restructuring 
process, they overstate the actual costs of default.
The IMF (2013) describes several episodes in 
which a country decided to initiate a restructuring 
process years after IMF staff had judged the debt 
situation to be unsustainable. In the majority of 
these cases, the countries decided to restructure 
and approach the International Monetary Fund 
only when they lost market access. There are, how-
ever, also cases in which delays were facilitated 
by official sector financing to countries that had 
lost market access and were facing unsustainable 
debt situations.15 A willingness to provide official 
financing to countries that face an unsustainable 
situation is sometimes driven by private creditors’ 
lobbying, especially if the restructuring could lead 
to large losses for banks located in official lenders’ 
countries, or due to the fear that a restructuring 
would trigger global market turmoil (IMF 2013). 
Restructuring too Little
In the late 1990s, it was feared that the process of 
debt securitization sparked by the Brady exchang-
es would amplify creditors’ coordination problems 
and lead to long and litigious negotiations. Howev-
er, by and large (Argentina’s 2005 restructuring is a 
notable exception; see the next section), these fears 
did not materialize. The duration of the average 
default episodes is now much shorter than in the 
1980s (Inter-American Development Bank 2006; 
Bi, Chamon, and Zettelmeyer 2011; Trebesch 2013). 
Quick debt restructurings with attractive offers, 
however, can lead to insufficient debt reduction 
and may not restore debt sustainability. The cur-
rent system may thus generate two, equally bad, 
equilibria (Powell 2011). In the first equilibrium, 
countries implement quick and creditor-friend-
ly restructurings but do not solve their debt-sus-
tainability problem. The second equilibrium can 
deliver larger debt relief at the cost of long negoti-
ations and protracted litigation. Evidence showing 
a positive relationship between haircuts (i.e., the 
losses faced by bondholders during debt restruc-
turing episodes) and the duration of restructuring 
episodes (figure 3) and the bimodal distribution of 
haircuts (figure 4) is consistent with such a view 
(Powell 2012). 
15  Greece is an example. According to the IMF’s (2013, 20) own assessment: “The case of Greece is also illustrative of the difficulty of introducing 
early debt restructuring. Even in the face of a sustained loss of market access, debt restructuring could be delayed because of the ample 
availability of official financing and the authorities’ stated willingness to entertain an unprecedented program of fiscal adjustment. Even under 
these supportive conditions, however, it was not possible to establish that there was a high probability of debt sustainability as required by the 
exceptional access policy. The chosen course was therefore to amend the policy to create an exception to the requirement of “high probability” 
in circumstances where “there is a high risk of international systemic spillovers.” Eventually, the planned adjustment proved unfeasible and, 
despite additional official sector financing on supportive terms, private debt restructuring became unavoidable and was launched in February 
2012.” There have been, however, also cases in which official financing and adjustments have been successful in restoring debt sustainability 
while avoiding a full-fledged debt restructuring. Turkey in the early 2000s is an example of a situation in which official financing was successful 
in addressing a nearly unsustainable debt situation (IMF 2013).
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Political distortions can amplify these problems . 
Myopic policymakers who want to quickly access 
the international capital market and do not inter-
nalize the costs of future defaults may decide to 
advocate the implementation of quick and credi-
tor-friendly restructurings . Equally myopic pol-
icymakers who do not need access to the inter-
national capital market may instead decide to be 
excessively tough with their creditors and hurt the 
country’s international reputation .
The official sector sometimes serves to exacerbate 
the problem through some bias stemming from 
myopia or overoptimism . Some of the restructuring 
episodes described by the IMF (2013) were based 
on overoptimistic debt sustainability assessments, 
with relatively small face-value haircuts that did not 
restore debt sustainability, required prolonged offi-
cial support and led to additional restructurings .16
Problems associated with suboptimal haircuts are 
amplified by the fact that haircuts and debt relief 
are different concepts . Haircuts are usually calcu-
lated by comparing the present value of old and 
new debts obtained by discounting future pay-
ments with the exit yield (i .e ., the interest rate faced 
by the country when it completes the restructur-
ing process) .17 However, countries should evalu-
ate their debts by using the interest rate that they 
expect to prevail in noncrisis times . Sturzenegger 
and Zettelmeyer (2007) apply this idea to a series 
of debt restructuring episodes that took place be-
tween 1998 and 2003 and show that the debt re-
lief of these restructuring episodes is significantly 
smaller than the losses suffered by investors . 
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Figure 3. the longer the restructuring negotiations, the heavier the haircut
16  However, there are also a few cases in which restructurings exercised that were deemed to be too timid ended up being successful in restoring 
debt sustainability . One example is Uruguay’s 2003 debt restructuring that, according to a 2006 assessment, was deemed to have left significant 
debt vulnerabilities (IMF 2006) . 
17 Formally: Hsz= 1 – Present Value New Debt (r) / Present Value Old Debt (r), where r is the exit yield .
Note: HIPC = Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative .
Sources: Powell, Sandleris, and Tavella (2013); Tavella (2013) .
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Alternatively, policymakers who believe that “stra-
tegic” defaults can have large reputational costs 
but that “unavoidable” defaults carry limited costs 
in terms of reputation may decide to postpone a 
needed default in order to signal that the default 
is indeed unavoidable. Finally, policymakers may 
delay necessary defaults because, in the absence 
of a clear mechanism to manage the restructuring 
process, they overstate the actual costs of default.
The IMF (2013) describes several episodes in 
which a country decided to initiate a restructuring 
process years after IMF staff had judged the debt 
situation to be unsustainable. In the majority of 
these cases, the countries decided to restructure 
and approach the International Monetary Fund 
only when they lost market access. There are, how-
ever, also cases in which delays were facilitated 
by official sector financing to countries that had 
lost market access and were facing unsustainable 
debt situations.15 A willingness to provide official 
financing to countries that face an unsustainable 
situation is sometimes driven by private creditors’ 
lobbying, especially if the restructuring could lead 
to large losses for banks located in official lenders’ 
countries, or due to the fear that a restructuring 
would trigger global market turmoil (IMF 2013). 
Restructuring too Little
In the late 1990s, it was feared that the process of 
debt securitization sparked by the Brady exchang-
es would amplify creditors’ coordination problems 
and lead to long and litigious negotiations. Howev-
er, by and large (Argentina’s 2005 restructuring is a 
notable exception; see the next section), these fears 
did not materialize. The duration of the average 
default episodes is now much shorter than in the 
1980s (Inter-American Development Bank 2006; 
Bi, Chamon, and Zettelmeyer 2011; Trebesch 2013). 
Quick debt restructurings with attractive offers, 
however, can lead to insufficient debt reduction 
and may not restore debt sustainability. The cur-
rent system may thus generate two, equally bad, 
equilibria (Powell 2011). In the first equilibrium, 
countries implement quick and creditor-friend-
ly restructurings but do not solve their debt-sus-
tainability problem. The second equilibrium can 
deliver larger debt relief at the cost of long negoti-
ations and protracted litigation. Evidence showing 
a positive relationship between haircuts (i.e., the 
losses faced by bondholders during debt restruc-
turing episodes) and the duration of restructuring 
episodes (figure 3) and the bimodal distribution of 
haircuts (figure 4) is consistent with such a view 
(Powell 2012). 
15  Greece is an example. According to the IMF’s (2013, 20) own assessment: “The case of Greece is also illustrative of the difficulty of introducing 
early debt restructuring. Even in the face of a sustained loss of market access, debt restructuring could be delayed because of the ample 
availability of official financing and the authorities’ stated willingness to entertain an unprecedented program of fiscal adjustment. Even under 
these supportive conditions, however, it was not possible to establish that there was a high probability of debt sustainability as required by the 
exceptional access policy. The chosen course was therefore to amend the policy to create an exception to the requirement of “high probability” 
in circumstances where “there is a high risk of international systemic spillovers.” Eventually, the planned adjustment proved unfeasible and, 
despite additional official sector financing on supportive terms, private debt restructuring became unavoidable and was launched in February 
2012.” There have been, however, also cases in which official financing and adjustments have been successful in restoring debt sustainability 
while avoiding a full-fledged debt restructuring. Turkey in the early 2000s is an example of a situation in which official financing was successful 
in addressing a nearly unsustainable debt situation (IMF 2013).
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prophylaxis
If the pathologies described above dominate the 
classic enforcement problem, a reform that facil-
itates the debt restructuring process, strengthens 
incentives for evaluating credit risk, and reduces 
procrastination could be efficient both ex post and 
ex ante: 
• If easier debt restructuring bolsters in-
centives to carefully assess country risk, 
a reform in this direction will increase 
borrowing costs for countries with unsus-
tainable policies and reduce their ability to 
accumulate excessive debts. Conversely, a 
smoother debt restructuring process may 
benefit (or at least not harm) countries 
that do not overborrow because, in the 
case of a large negative shock, investors 
are likely to obtain higher recovery values 
(Rogoff 2003).18
• A system that guarantees speedy and 
transparent debt restructurings can also 
reduce the overborrowing associated with 
creditor moral hazard because it allows 
the international financial institutions to 
resist pressure to lend to countries that 
face sustainability problems. This will be 
particularly true if the restructuring pro-
cess is combined with a clear set of rules 
that allows for exceptional financing to 
countries that face liquidity problems but 
prevent official lenders from providing 
funds to countries that face an unsustain-
able debt situation. 
• A sovereign debt restructuring framework 
could also have positive effects on debt com-
position. Reforms that reduce moral hazard 
and lead to more careful country-specific 
risk assessment may provide policymakers 
with incentives to issue “safer”—from the 
18  A possible caveat is that, in the presence of uncertainty (or other market imperfections), creditors may reduce lending flows to countries with a 
fully sustainable debt situation.
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point of view of the issuer—debt instru-
ments . Enforceable seniority rules that ad-
dress debt dilution problems may reduce 
overborrowing and increase investors’ 
willingness to hold such instruments .
Although marginal improvements to the debt 
workout process are unlikely to result in inefficien-
cies ex ante,19 it is possible that reform designed 
to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring could 
overshoot and, by reducing a country’s willingness 
to pay, raise the borrowing costs of solvent sover-
eigns . However, the chances that this might hap-
pen are contained by the fact that willingness to 
pay is sustained by the economic costs of default, 
which are not directly affected by the debt restruc-
turing regime . Besides the political costs of default 
mentioned above, a large literature suggests that 
defaults inflict broad “collateral damage” on the 
debtor country . Defaults may have a negative ef-
fect on the country’s overall reputation (not just its 
reputation vis-à-vis its creditors) and increase the 
costs of all its transactions and agreements (eco-
nomic and political, domestic and international) 
that require a substantial amount of trust among 
the counterparties (Cole and Kehoe 1998) .20 If 
such reputational costs are large enough, the coun-
try’s willingness to pay will be maintained even in 
the presence of an (ex-post) efficient debt restruc-
turing mechanism . Indeed, a sovereign debt court 
able to assess ability to pay could create willing-
ness to pay by increasing the reputational costs of 
strategic defaults and mitigate the delayed default 
problems by reducing the reputational costs of un-
avoidable defaults .
To conclude, there are multiple ex-ante problems 
associated with sovereign debt, and these prob-
lems in principle could be reduced through a sov-
ereign bankruptcy procedure, without necessarily 
exacerbating the enforcement problem . This said, 
the design of complex mechanisms that can deal 
with several inefficiencies at once is rife with diffi-
culties and would require significant information 
and commitment capacity . The last chapter of this 
report discusses whether such mechanisms might 
be legally and politically feasible . 
19  For evidence showing that collective action clauses do not significantly increase borrowing costs for most issuers, see Eichengreen and Portes 
(1995); Eichengreen and Mody (2000); and Bradley and Gulati (2012) .
20  An alternative class of models suggests that sovereign defaults may have large economic costs because they reveal negative information on the 
underlying structure of the economy (Sandleris 2008; Catão, Fostel, and Kapur 2007) .
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A Fundamental Tension
From a legal perspective, there are two notewor-
thy distinctions between corporate and sovereign 
debt . First, as already discussed, sovereign debt is 
mostly unenforceable . This is because sovereign 
immunity shields most public assets from credi-
tors, even if they win a judgment against a default-
ing government .21 The debtor’s property is either 
inside its own national borders (where the courts 
are loath to side with creditors against their own 
government), or enjoys the special protections that 
are provided for embassies, central bank funds, 
military installations and the like . Property used 
for commercial activity is more accessible, but 
since the wave of privatizations in the late 20th 
century, few governments have conducted much 
commercial business in their own name . Although 
sovereigns often waive immunities when they bor-
row abroad, courts sometimes interpret general 
waivers narrowly or even ignore them . Where the 
legal scope for enforcement is so limited, political 
pressures play an outsize role, adding to uncertain-
ty about the outcome of any given case . 
Second, although sovereign debt contracts are 
hard to enforce, they also last forever . Without 
bankruptcy, sovereign debt cannot be discharged 
to give the country a fresh start . In most cases, a 
determined creditor insisting on full repayment 
cannot be forced to restructure its bonds . At the 
same time, the combination of immunity and 
transactional technique that shields debtors from 
enforcement is imperfect . It relies on diverse na-
tional laws and contract provisions . When credi-
tors try to attach external payment flows, the ef-
fectiveness of immunity as a shield depends on 
individual sovereigns’ capacity to litigate and sur-
vive the loss of market access for potentially long 
stretches of time . This implies that creditors with 
the time, will and resources to pursue a country to 
the ends of the Earth can try to make life difficult 
for it in perpetuity, throwing obstacles in the way 
of its international trade and financial activity . 
Arguably, the balance between these fundamen-
tal characteristics of sovereign debt—the fact that 
enforcement is difficult and unpredictable, but 
not absent altogether; and the fact that sovereigns 
cannot get a fresh start—has made orderly debt 
restructurings possible in the new era of bonded 
debt . Faced with the alternatives of accepting a 
reasonable take-it-or-leave-it debt exchange offer 
or the hard work and uncertainty of enforcement, 
CHAPTER 3:  Argentina and the Rebirth of the 
Holdout Problem
21 E .g ., see Weidemaier (forthcoming) .
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most creditors will accept the offer, particularly 
when the litigation prospects and secondary mar-
ket values of defaulted instruments are further 
eroded by restructuring techniques (Bi, Chamon, 
and Zettelmeyer 2011) . This calculus may not ap-
ply to specialized distressed debt funds—expert 
litigators—that have the patience, skill and deep 
pockets to exploit the loopholes in sovereign im-
munity—provided the sovereign’s overall debt 
stock is reduced to make side payments possible . 
Sovereigns, in turn, will understand that in the 
presence of these loopholes, and given the non-
dischargeability of debt, holdouts can be a perma-
nent source of irritation and disruption . As a re-
sult, they will typically settle, and sometimes repay 
holdouts in full . 
Since the revival of the sovereign bond market in 
the 1990s, the fundamental tension between the 
lack of enforcement and the lack of a fresh start 
has produced a regime where few creditors hold 
out . Those that do hold out do not fundamental-
ly disrupt the restructuring process . With very 
few exceptions—most notably Argentina, where 
the authorities took a confrontational stance with 
creditors, largely for reasons of domestic political 
economy—all debt exchanges since the return of 
the emerging markets’ sovereign bond market in 
the early 1990s have conformed to this pattern . As 
we argued in the previous section, some of these 
debt exchanges did not go far enough in reduc-
ing debt burdens . But they certainly constituted 
a “technology” for debt restructuring that mini-
mized litigation and exclusion from sovereign debt 
markets . 
The Return of the Holdout
Those creditors that refused Argentina’s restruc-
turing offers have been chasing it around the globe 
since 2001, using tactics that range from the exotic 
to the cartoonish . However, recent rulings in New 
York may give creditors the first broadly replicable 
remedy against sovereign debtors since the days of 
gunboat diplomacy a century ago (box 1) . Rely-
ing on the “pari passu” clause in Argentina’s fiscal 
agency agreement, a group of holdouts secured an 
order that bars Argentina from making payments 
on its restructured debt unless it pays holdouts 
proportionately (“ratably”) . Under court orders, 
if the new bondholders get paid in full under the 
restructured contracts, holdouts are entitled to full 
payment under their original contracts .
Because versions of the pari passu clause are pres-
ent in all sovereign bonds, the ratable payment 
order in New York has given creditors a way to in-
tercept flows from a wide range of sovereigns to 
firms and official institutions . For the first time in 
decades, sovereign debt enforcement looks like a 
much more realistic prospect in a major financial 
jurisdiction . This is because cross-border payment 
flows remain ubiquitous and essential for most 
sovereigns . The pari passu remedy operates by in-
flicting collateral damage; that is, those creditors 
under performing debt contracts are blocked from 
receiving their payments, and payment and clear-
ing systems and trustees are threatened with con-
tempt of court if they help the debtor pay its per-
forming bonds .22 This forces the debtor to choose 
between repaying holdouts in full and defaulting 
on creditors within the reach of U .S . courts . The 
latter, in turn, would imply a loss of access to large 
segments of the international market, along with 
possibly interfering with trade-related payments .
In a world of well-coordinated creditors, giving 
creditors a powerful new enforcement tool might 
improve welfare . Creditors would enforce debt re-
payment when it is in their collective interest to do 
so . This would rule out “rogue debtor” behavior—
that is, instances when countries repudiate their 
22  Although the creditors said that they were not trying to block payments to the IMF, the terms of the court orders appear to cover private and 
official payments in equal measure .
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box 1. nml capital, ltd. v. argentina
Argentina defaulted on more than $80 billion in foreign bonds in 2001 . Two debt exchanges and over a 
decade later, it has restructured 93 percent of this total . NML Capital, Ltd ., is among the creditors that 
rejected Argentina’s offers and sued for full payment . NML is an affiliate of Elliott Associates, which 
specializes in distressed sovereign debt litigation . Elliott’s successful lawsuit against Peru a decade ear-
lier, on the same theory it has since used against Argentina, was prominently cited to support SDRM .
Unlike Peru, Argentina has refused to settle with the holdouts, and it has chosen instead to pay the 
cost of moving its assets beyond its creditors’ reach and to avoid new borrowing abroad, for fear of 
attachment . 
By 2012, both the creditors and the courts were ready to escalate debt enforcement . In February, the 
U .S . federal judge in New York, who has presided over Argentina’s debt litigation all these years, ruled 
that it had violated the pari passu clause in its old bonds with its protracted failure to pay, by enacting 
laws that impede settlement, and by making official statements of defiance—among other things . The 
court required Argentina to pay both its old and new bonds “ratably .” The court later elaborated that 
ratable payments meant that Argentina must pay NML and its co-plaintiffs full principal and past-
due interest (now $1 .4 billion) whenever it makes the periodic coupon payment on the restructured 
bonds . The judge prohibited Argentina from rerouting payments on the new bonds, and threatened to 
sanction third parties that might help Argentina pay this debt but not NML . The threat covers trust-
ees, clearinghouses and payment systems, even naming some located in Belgium, Luxembourg and 
the United Kingdom . The court effectively gave Argentina only two ways to comply: pay everyone, or 
default on everyone .
In October 2012, the U .S . Federal Appeals Court for the Second Circuit agreed that Argentina had 
violated the pari passu clause and must make ratable payments . It dismissed the U .S . executive branch’s 
objections to the lower court’s contract interpretation, its warnings that the remedy would impede 
future restructurings, and its claim that the court had violated the U .S . Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act by telling Argentina how to spend its treasury funds anywhere in the world .
In August 2013, the Second Circuit also affirmed the lower court’s formula for ratable payment, and 
refused to limit up front the injunction’s territorial reach, or its potential impact on third parties . The 
court was unpersuaded by the many submissions from the exchange bondholders and financial insti-
tutions potentially subject to sanctions . However, the injunction remains stayed (suspended) for now, 
to allow appeals to the U .S . Supreme Court . The stay may be at risk in the wake of Argentina’s recent 
announcement that it would offer to swap its restructured New York bonds for domestic debt with 
payment streams beyond the reach of U .S . courts .
Argentina appealed to the U .S . Supreme Court in June 2013, asking it to review the holding that it may 
not service its new bonds unless it pays the plaintiffs ratably . France has filed a friend-of-the-court brief 
urging review, and stressing the consequences for debt restructuring and the Paris Club . In light of the 
August 2013 court decision, Argentina and other countries are likely to make other submissions to the 
Supreme Court . The Court is also likely to ask the U .S . government for its views .
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debts or offer creditors a debt restructuring well 
below their capacity to pay . These have been rare 
in sovereign debt since World War II, much rarer 
than the opposite problem of overindebted coun-
tries that restructure too little too late, as argued 
in the previous chapter; however, ruling out rogue 
behavior entirely surely would be good news, par-
ticularly from the perspective of new borrowers 
with short track records . If, conversely, a debtor 
is genuinely unable to pay—or debt is inefficiently 
high, creating a debt overhang problem that weighs 
on growth and future capacity to pay—creditors 
could collectively agree to renegotiate debt con-
tracts . Debtors would be discharged of past debt 
obligations through a change in the contract terms 
of each and every existing debt obligation .
In the absence of effective creditor coordination, 
however, the New York decisions could turn out 
to be a big problem . This is because they are like-
ly to upset the delicate balance between imperfect 
enforcement and the nondischargeability of debt 
that has made ad hoc debt exchanges reasonably 
smooth in the past . Though sovereign debt remains 
nondischargeable, potential holdouts have been 
handed a much better enforcement technique than 
they had in the past: “third party enforcement” di-
rected not at the sovereign itself but at those private 
parties on which the sovereign depends . 
This will make successful debt exchanges harder to 
coordinate, even when they are in the joint interests 
of the debtor country and the creditors collective-
ly . On one hand, the bargaining power of potential 
holdouts will be higher, making holdout strategies 
a more attractive proposition . One the other hand, 
creditors considering an exchange offer must weigh 
not only the proposed haircut but also the prospect 
of defending a lawsuit or, at a minimum, having 
their reduced payments interrupted by future hold-
outs . This means that even where litigation is unat-
tractive to most creditors, participation is likely to 
become much less attractive . 
As a result, exchange offers could fail for lack of 
participation even when they were collectively 
optimal, or they could result in much lighter hair-
cuts than would be needed to restore debt sustain-
ability . The country and most of its creditors, and 
perhaps even its neighbors and other victims of 
spillovers, could risk getting permanently stuck in 
debt purgatory .
no Easy Way out
The opinions of the U .S . Court of Appeals mistak-
enly suggest that the court follows on the heels of a 
major shift in sovereign debt contracts that facili-
tates restructuring—the advent of collective action 
clauses (CACs)—which creates the space for more 
robust enforcement . In this view, the rise of CACs 
gets the debtor closer to a fresh start and justifies 
“rebalancing” in the direction of enforcement . 
However, whereas CACs can be helpful, they do 
not—at least in the variety that is most common 
in sovereign debt contracts today—eliminate hold-
outs in sovereign debt restructuring so as to make 
the pari passu remedy unimportant . Under the pre-
vailing model of CACs, a supermajority of creditors 
in a single bond series may vote to amend the terms 
and bind the dissenting minority . However, credi-
tors can and do target small series trading at a deep 
discount, where they can buy a blocking position 
with relative ease, hold out, and threaten to sue . For 
instance, more than half of all foreign-law bonds in 
the Greek debt restructuring failed to get the need-
ed votes to amend the terms . These bonds are still 
being serviced according to the original terms . 
Could exit consents offer a solution? Since Ecua-
dor’s 2000 restructuring, this has been a popular 
technique to deter holdouts in sovereign restruc-
turing . When participating creditors exchange 
their old bonds for new ones, they are asked to 
vote to amend certain nonfinancial terms of the 
bond that may be altered by simple majority, with 
the result binding on all . In the early days of the 
tactic, it could be used to strip out a bond’s terms 
concerning negative pledge, pari passu, listing, im-
munity and jurisdiction . Nonparticipants risked 
staying behind with an illiquid and potentially 
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box 2. the AssenAgon case
 
CACs and exit consents both rely on majority rule . When a technique empowers a majority of bond-
holders to impose restructuring terms on dissenters, it raises the possibility of unfair treatment . Such 
fairness concerns have featured most prominently in U .K . court cases about the oppression of bond-
holder minorities . Taken to the extreme, this line of reasoning can block or severely limit the use of 
CACs and exit consents, and breathe new life into holdout strategies .
The High Court decision in Assenagon Asset Management S.A. and Irish Bank Resolution Corporation 
Limited (Formerly Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited) involved the use of exit consents in an Irish 
bank’s restructuring and recapitalization exercise . Holders of Anglo-Irish bank bonds were invited to 
exchange their holdings for new ones at 20 cents on the euro . At the same time, they were asked to vote 
to give the Irish Bank Restructuring Corporation, which had taken over the bank, the right to redeem 
nonparticipating bonds at 1 cent on €1,000, effectively wiping out their value . The High Court deemed 
this oppressive and ruled for the fund challenging the transaction . 
The judge appeared amenable to a softer version of exit consents, whereby nonparticipants are given 
value equivalent to that received by the participants . However, when the worst possible outcome for 
nonparticipation is getting the same terms as everyone else, the urgency of signing up for an exchange 
goes away .
worthless instrument . However, since the advent 
of CACs on a mass scale in 2003, important non-
financial terms in sovereign bonds have generally 
migrated to the list of reserve matters that require 
supermajority amendment, along with financial 
terms . This means that blocking the removal of 
a pari passu clause through exit consents is now 
just as easy as blocking the change in the payment 
terms itself . In addition, a U .K . court’s decision in 
2012 potentially limits the use of exit consents in 
distressed exchanges (box 2) . 
This seems to leave only one approach to ad hoc 
debt restructuring that could avoid the new threat 
of third-part enforcement, albeit at a much higher 
risk of litigation by “mainstream” creditors . Rather 
than offering a debt exchange that would create in-
centives to hold out, debtors could simply default 
“ratably” on all creditors at once . For example, a 
debtor could announce a new payment stream 
equivalent to that which it would have offered in 
the form of a new debt preceding the New York 
decisions . By treating all creditors the same, this 
approach would sidestep the possibility of enforce-
ment . But this comes at a high price, given that the 
debtor would plunge into a torrent of litigation 
and likely forgo any hope of a fresh start . 
Pari Passu Is not All
Even in the absence of legal and institutional re-
forms along the lines proposed in this report, the 
pari passu problem may well recede over the next 
decade or so (though only very gradually, given the 
typical maturities of sovereign bonds) . Sovereigns 
and their creditors, including major trade associa-
tions, have adapted their contracts in response to 
litigation and other restructuring developments . 
There is some evidence that this adaptation pro-
cess has already begun in response to New York 
court rulings . Hence, although recent legal devel-
opments are likely to pose problems for debt re-
structuring in the short and medium terms, their 
effect is likely to diminish over time . 
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However, this fact obscures a more significant 
structural problem, of which the pari passu saga 
is a symptom . With no clear path to enforcement 
or a fresh start, both sides in the sovereign debt 
restructuring game try to leverage contract provi-
sions to win a given round . As the pari passu clause 
is gradually replaced, another technique will likely 
surface as a platform for recovery . All it will take 
is for one adventurous (or frustrated) court to in-
terpret a contract term in an unconventional way 
for a brief period of time . In the next round, sover-
eigns might respond with more aggressive restruc-
turing techniques . The same contractual flexibility 
that produces ingenious restructuring techniques 
lends itself to ingenious enforcement techniques, 
and so on . 
Put differently, contracts as interpreted by judges 
have proven inadequate to mediate the tension be-
tween the lack of enforcement and the impossibili-
ty of discharge in sovereign debt . To the extent that 
contracts improve over time and leave less room 
for interpretation, this problem may recede . That 
said, experience suggests that this is at best an un-
certain process that will take several decades—ad-
aptation is a long and winding road littered with 
institutional problems, and is not at all certain to 
address interpretive shocks or result in more per-
fect contracts (Gulati and Scott 2013) . Hence, a 
solution that is both durable and takes effects rea-
sonably quickly will require policy action—wheth-
er to improve contracts in a more radical and co-
ordinated fashion than adaptation would produce 
on its own, or to create statutory solutions that can 
complement existing contracts . 
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Euro Pathologies
Although some of the pathologies related to 
overborrowing and delayed restructuring that 
were described in chapter 2 can be illustrated us-
ing euro area experiences (particularly the case of 
Greece), they have been well known in emerging 
market settings for some time . This said, the euro 
area does appear to be special in ways implying 
that the general case for an overhaul of the rules 
governing debt restructuring—and particularly 
for a treaty-based mechanism—may apply with 
special force . In particular, the euro area embod-
ies two structural features that exacerbate both the 
ex-ante pathologies described in chapter 2 and the 
difficulties of managing debt crises ex post, partic-
ularly in combination .
First, a debt crisis afflicting one country in the euro 
area constitutes a common problem for the entire 
currency area, to a degree that dwarfs crisis-related 
spillovers anywhere else in the world . This is partly 
the result of close trade and financial linkages—
including through holdings of sovereign debt by 
banking groups and other institutional investors 
with cross-border presence . However, economic 
linkages are also very high—for example, between 
the U .S . and Canada, between the U .K . and some 
euro area countries, and between Germany and 
Switzerland—without tying these countries to-
gether in quite the same way as within the euro 
area . Apart from a shared and often difficult his-
tory that rarely leaves room for indifference, what 
sets the euro area apart from other highly integrat-
ed areas is that the common currency itself con-
stitutes a powerful channel that links economic 
outcomes among its members . This is partly be-
cause the policies of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) affect the entire currency area, but most of 
all because of the threat of a collapse of the com-
mon currency, and the associated disruptions that 
this would create across the currency area . As a re-
sult, a disorderly default in one part of the curren-
cy union could have massive implications for its 
other members—even members whose direct ex-
posures to the afflicted country are not very high .
Second, euro area countries have fewer policy in-
struments for dealing with high debt . In particular, 
unless the euro area as a whole has a debt problem 
that is symmetrical across most members of the 
currency union, the area’s member countries can-
not count on devaluation or accommodative mon-
etary policy to offset the contractionary impact 
of fiscal adjustment . As a result, debt reduction 
efforts are economically and socially more costly 
for given debt and deficit levels, and debt sustain-
ability problems arise at lower levels of debt than 
in comparable countries with their own monetary 
authorities .
CHAPTER 4: Euro Area Issues
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Note that the second problem—a lack of monetary 
policy instruments to help deal with high debt—is 
by no means unique to the euro area . It is, in fact, 
almost identical to the standard problem arising 
from foreign currency borrowing that has afflicted 
emerging market economies for many decades . Just 
as in the euro area, the presence of foreign currency 
debt renders standard monetary policy instruments 
essentially useless in a crisis, and implies that crises 
can be self-fulfilling .23 What is special about the euro 
area, however, is the combination of a lack of instru-
ments to deal with debt crises in individual coun-
tries and the fact that, if these debt crises spin out 
of control, there could be dire consequences for the 
entire common currency area . As a result, the need 
both for a regime that prevents the emergence of 
debt problems and for additional policy instruments 
to handle debt crises when they do occur has been 
much more urgent in the euro area than elsewhere .
So far, these “additional policy instruments” have 
consisted mainly in the combination of fiscal ad-
justment and large-scale, conditional official sup-
port (either through the European Financial Sta-
bility Facility / ESM or the ECB’s “Outright Mone-
tary Transactions” program) . Though these forms 
of support can stop self-fulfilling debt crises when 
debt is in principle sustainable, by definition they 
do not work in unsustainable debt cases . But be-
cause official support and fiscal adjustment are the 
only instruments on the table, the existing regime 
creates an incentive to misdiagnose debt prob-
lems—declaring the unsustainable sustainable—
and to stigmatize those that disagree . Before the 
Greek debt restructuring finally became the official 
policy of the European Union in the second half 
of 2011, even the discussion of debt restructuring 
in Europe was effectively branded as un-Europe-
an by influential policymakers .24 In turn, this can 
result in adjustment burdens that ultimately prove 
unfeasible, but usually not until they have caused 
great social and political harm . 
At the same time, large-scale crisis lending can 
give rise to moral hazard, at two levels: at the ex-
pense of the European taxpayer if official loans 
themselves have to be written down—as seems 
likely when lending occurs in unsustainable debt 
cases—but also at the expense of the domestic tax-
payer, who is required to repay official loans that 
are being used to service debts to private credi-
tors . The consequences are underpricing of debt 
and overborrowing, particularly in countries with 
weaker institutions and political systems that are 
not fully responsive to taxpayer interests .
Fortunately, the euro area is special not only with 
respect to its problems in preventing and contain-
ing debt crises but also in its potential to establish 
common institutions or legal frameworks to create 
new solutions . Euro area members are of course 
also members of the EU, which has had a long, and 
for the most part successful, record of cooperating 
through supranational legal frameworks and insti-
tutions . Furthermore, the euro area has one par-
ticular specific institution—the ESM, created by 
treaty in 2012—that could be easily adapted to em-
bed a treaty-based debt restructuring regime . The 
next chapter hence explores the possibility of an 
amendment of the ESM treaty that would attempt 
to impart incentives for better debt management 
ex ante, bestow legitimacy on debt restructuring 
when this is in the common interest, and deal with 
the legal obstacles to debt restructurings posed by 
holdouts .
Before going down this route, however, it is nec-
essary to address four possible objections, all of 
which are specific to the euro area context: 
• First, does the diagnosis change if one takes 
into account the nexus between public and 
private debt—including overlending by 
banks? In light of this nexus, might the 
creation of a euro area–based Banking 
23 See Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2003), and the references therein . 
24  Nicolas Sarkozy, “We Will Show That Europeans Pay Their Debts,” International Financing Review, December 10, 2011 . Similar statements were 
made by ECB officials, particularly Lorenzo Bini Smaghi; see “Private Sector Involvement: From (Good) Theory to (Bad) Practice,” Berlin, June 
6, 2011, http://www .ecb .int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110606 .en .html . 
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Union—with a common fiscal backstop—
be sufficient to deal with sovereign debt 
problems in Europe?
• Second, was the Greek debt restructur-
ing a game-changer in the sense that it 
demonstrated the feasibility of orderly 
debt restructuring in the euro area? In 
light of this success, does the euro area still 
need a more formal restructuring regime? 
Or does the Greek restructuring solve the 
problem both ex ante, by sending a warn-
ing to future reckless sovereign borrow-
ers and lenders, and ex post, by creating 
a template for future restructurings in the 
euro area, should they become necessary?
• Third, could the problem be solved by the 
“aggregated” collective action clauses that, 
since early 2013, have begun to be incor-
porated into the newly issued sovereign 
bonds of all euro area members? Do these 
CACs already constitute a restructuring 
regime of sorts that might obviate the need 
for a more heavy-handed alternative?
• Fourth and finally, could the recent re-
forms of the European fiscal framework 
make a debt restructuring regime re-
dundant? Should not the new rules and 
strengthened oversight suffice to ensure 
fiscal discipline and to curb moral hazard? 
Also, ESM funding is already conditional 
on fulfilling the fiscal targets, so why is 
there a need to go any further?
Banking Union and the nexus 
between Private and Public Debt
It has often been pointed out that the euro area crisis 
was primarily caused by capital flows and bank credit 
directed mainly at private rather than public borrow-
ers, together with the higher risk premia and break-
down in interbank lending triggered by the subprime 
crisis in the United States .25 With few exceptions—
chiefly, the problems of Greece—sovereign debt 
problems in the euro area have been a consequence, 
rather than the cause, of this broader crisis . 
In the context of the discussion so far, this raises 
several questions . If the main problem in Europe 
was (and to some extent still is) privately held debt, 
does the emphasis on sovereign debt restructuring 
miss the point? Even worse, might a sovereign 
debt restructuring regime be rendered ineffectual 
by the tight link between private and public debt? 
And to the extent that this link is at the core of the 
sovereign debt problem in Europe, would it not be 
addressed by the Banking Union that Europe has 
begun to build, obviating the need for a sovereign 
restructuring regime?
 
The first and most obvious answer to these points 
is that although public and private debt are related 
for the usual reasons—because private overbor-
rowing can become public in a banking crisis, and 
but also because public overborrowing can crowd 
out private borrowing—they are still separate 
problems in the sense that they are driven by dis-
tinct moral hazard problems, each of which would 
continue to pose a threat if the other were elim-
inated . In particular, even if new financial sector 
institutions and macroprudential policies were to 
eliminate any chance of unsalutary private credit 
booms in Europe, a potential public overborrow-
ing problem would remain, for the reasons de-
scribed in chapter 2, and would be particularly 
important to address in the euro area . For the rea-
sons described earlier in this chapter—the lack of 
country-level monetary policy instruments, larger 
mutual costs of debt crises, and moral hazard—
prudent sovereign debt levels in a currency union 
of closely integrated economies should probably 
be lower than elsewhere . This may require a supra-
national debt restructuring framework to both set 
25  See, e .g ., Lane (2012); Lane and Pels (2012); Shambaugh (2012); Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012); and Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
(2013) . 
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the right incentives and deal with large accidents . 
The presence of such a framework does not, of 
course, obviate the need to also improve financial 
sector supervision and resolution, both because of 
the disruptiveness of crises caused by private cred-
it booms and to prevent private debt from becom-
ing a public liability . 
Second, while sovereign bankruptcy should obvi-
ously not be the first line of defense against bank-
ing crises, it can help, even with private borrowing 
problems . Ex post, it would provide a framework for 
the restructuring of public liabilities regardless of 
their origin . To the extent that debt markets believe 
that private liabilities could at some point become 
public, this should create additional incentives—via 
the national treasury—to prevent overborrowing . 
In a country with rapidly rising private debt and a 
strong chance that this debt will become public, but 
without any chance of sovereign debt restructuring, 
sovereign borrowing will remain cheap . In the same 
world with a chance of debt restructuring, unsus-
tainable private borrowing should at some point be-
gin to affect sovereign risk premia, even if sovereign 
debt remains low . Because it gives the fiscal author-
ities a wake-up call, this is a good thing . 
Third, euro area-based Banking Union,  a fiscal 
backstop and a sovereign debt restructuring re-
gime should be viewed as—indeed, a sovereign 
debt restructuring regime is likely necessary for 
the proper function of the Banking Union . Based 
on the arguments that were made at the beginning 
of this chapter, one can in principle imagine two 
alternative, internally consistent institutional ar-
rangements for the euro area that recognize the 
links between public and private debt . First, one 
in which both supervision and resolution remain 
national responsibilities, and in which a sovereign 
debt restructuring regime deals with national debt 
shocks—regardless of whether their origin lies in 
the public or private sector . Second, one in which 
both supervision and resolution are joint, and 
there is both a common backstop and a sovereign 
debt restructuring regime . 
In a financial area with cross-border banking, the 
latter is preferable because it internalizes the mul-
ticountry effects both of banking in normal times 
and of bank resolutions . But it will work only if the 
authorities whose decisions ultimately influence 
the quality of bank assets have the right incentives . 
With major decision areas—for example, influenc-
ing housing markets—remaining at the national 
level even in a perfect Banking Union, this re-
quires that national authorities retain “skin in the 
game,” in the sense that national fiscal backstops, if 
required in the resolution process, are tapped be-
fore common euro area–level backstops . This, in 
turn, requires that meaningful fiscal buffers exist 
at the level of all euro area countries, which in turn 
require creating incentives against overborrowing 
through standard fiscal channels—one of the pur-
poses of orderly sovereign restructuring . At the 
same time, because significant decisionmaking au-
thority in the Banking Union will be centralized, 
the possibility of sovereign restructuring does not 
obviate the need for a common fiscal backstop . If 
decisionmaking authority over national financial 
systems is explicitly or implicitly shared, so, too, 
must fiscal responsibility .27
The Greek Debt Restructuring—a 
Template?
Notwithstanding its restructuring-unfriendly con-
ditions, the euro area recently pulled off the larg-
est debt restructuring in history: the 2012 Greek 
bond exchange, which was successful in the sense 
26  While it is beyond the scope of this report to propose how these mutual responsibilities should be calibrated, the general principle is clear: 
There must be a relation between national responsibility for preventing financial sector accidents and the contribution toward the resolution 
of a financial sector crisis that would be covered from national fiscal sources before use of ESM resources . The latter could be set as a share 
of national GDP (e .g ., 20 percent, set uniformly across euro zone members on the assumption that national financial sector responsibilities 
comprise similar functions in all countries) . Should this exceed national fiscal capacity, sovereign and banking system assets would have to be 
restructured jointly .
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of being orderly; in achieving high creditor partic-
ipation (97 percent); and in resulting in large debt 
relief, on the order of 50 percent of GDP .27 Was the 
Greek restructuring a game-changer that it could 
by itself usher in an era when unsustainable debt 
cases in Europe are dealt with through orderly re-
structuring? Even ignoring the fact that European 
policymakers have consistently emphasized that 
the Greek case would remain unique and not set 
any precedent for the handling of other high-debt 
cases, there are reasons to doubt this .
First, the Greek debt restructuring was quick and 
achieved high creditor participation for mainly one 
reason: 93 percent of Greek bonds were governed 
by local (Greek) law . This permitted the Greek Par-
liament to “retrofit” a collective action mechanism 
on the local law debt stock that operated to sweep 
potential holdouts into the deal, and also gave 
Greece scope to offer creditors extra incentives 
that reduced the appeal of holding out, namely, 
an upgrade in governing law . However, not every 
euro area country enjoys the local law advantage 
that Greece did . This applies particularly to some 
of the smaller euro area countries and borrowings 
by subsovereign entities . Cyprus is a case in point . 
During its recent bail-in of investors, it imposed 
the bulk of the pain on its bank depositors, while 
holders of its foreign-law-governed bonds (a sub-
stantial portion of its debt stock) have been paid in 
full and on time .
Second, the Greek approach to restructuring re-
quired large volumes of official financing, as the 
exchange offer included an exceptionally high “cash 
sweetener” to incentivize participation .28 This is un-
likely to be repeated . Rescue money is becoming 
scarce in the euro area, both because of public and 
political opposition to further bailouts and be-
cause the pool of available resources is shrinking, 
as demand continues to increase and the potential 
roles of the European Financial Stability Facility / 
ESM are being expanded (most recently to direct 
recapitalization of banks) . 
Third, the Greek restructuring gave potential 
holdouts an easy pass—both by avoiding virtual-
ly any threats directed at holdouts ex ante and by 
repaying them in full ex post . This creates a prec-
edent that will likely embolden holdouts in future 
restructurings .
Fourth, a little-noticed aspect of the Greek restruc-
turing is that it attempted to restructure not only its 
sovereign bonds but also some of its sovereign guar-
antees . Sovereign guarantees can quickly become 
direct sovereign obligations when a country hits 
a crisis (particularly if the guarantees were being 
used to prop up already-weak domestic institutions 
that become weaker still when the crisis hits) . As a 
historical matter, sovereign guarantees have tend-
ed not to pose a major problem in restructurings 
because distressed nations do not usually have too 
many of them . The crisis in the euro area, howev-
er, has been different . Many of its members have 
issued large volumes of sovereign guarantees in 
the period since 2008, and are continuing to do so . 
This means that when the next euro area restruc-
turing comes along, the guarantees will also need 
to be tackled, without a clear playbook on how to 
do so (Buchheit and Gulati 2013) .
Finally, a large fraction of the bonds issued by the 
weaker euro area sovereigns have recently been 
moving out of the hands of foreign investors and 
into the hands of local banks and other domestic 
institutions (Brutti and Sauré 2013) . That means 
that any significant restructuring of the govern-
27  This is not to say that it was perfect . It came far too late, created large risks for the European official creditors, left money on the table, and 
ultimately was not deep enough to restore Greece to sustainability . Furthermore, it created a bad precedent in its exceedingly generous 
treatment of holdouts . For the details, see Zettelmeyer et al . (2012) .
28  Quasi-cash payouts (in the form of short-term European Financial Stability Facility bills) made up about two-thirds of the value of the package 
of new instruments offered to Greece’s private creditors . This high reliance on cash seems to have been unprecedented in the history of 
sovereign debt restructuring . See Zettelmeyer et al . (2012) for details .
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ment’s debt may cause a domestic banking crisis . 
Of course, this is the reason why the migration of 
sovereign debt to domestic holders, and banks in 
particular, could be happening . Domestic banks 
are relatively immune from restructurings because 
they expect to be recapitalized, for financial stabil-
ity reasons, if their losses from domestic sovereign 
bond holdings are sufficiently high . Indeed, if the 
holdings of the banking system as a whole are high 
enough, the restructuring will likely not happen at 
all (see Broner et al . 2010) . 
Hence, while the Greek debt restructuring approach 
was successful in Greece and can be useful in specif-
ic cases, it falls short of providing a template that 
could be a permanent fixture of the European fi-
nancial architecture . Indeed, its success was part-
ly due to strategies—including the large-scale use 
of cash incentives, and the generous treatment of 
holdouts—that may make future restructurings 
more difficult .
Are the new Euro-CACs the 
Solution? 
Since January 2013, newly issued European sov-
ereign bonds have begun to incorporate collective 
action clauses . The trigger for a debt restructur-
ing (both sovereign, as in the case of Greece, and 
private, as in Cyprus) is based on an ex-post debt 
sustainability assessment by the Troika i .e ., the Eu-
ropean Commission, the ECB and the IMF) . The 
intention of these clauses is to facilitate debt re-
structuring when appropriate and improve incen-
tives ex ante . But unfortunately, the new regime is 
unlikely to be sufficient, for two main reasons:
• Although euro-CACs may help with the 
ex-post debt restructuring, they are no 
panacea, as they need to be voted on bond 
by bond (see Gelpern and Gulati 2013) . 
It is telling that distressed debt inves-
tors explicitly targeted Greek bonds with 
U .K .-law CACs: These holdout investors 
succeeded by purchasing blocking mi-
norities in individual bond series, which 
could not be offset by pro-restructuring 
majorities elsewhere . Though euro area 
CACs contain an “aggregation feature” 
that allows changes at the individual bond 
level to be decided with a lower majority 
if enough investors across all bonds vote 
for a restructuring, this feature is much 
weaker than the mechanism for aggregat-
ing bondholder votes across all domestic 
law bonds that was used in Greece .29 Fur-
thermore, euro-CACs do not deal with the 
vast existing stock of European sovereign 
debt . Some of this was issued under do-
mestic law so that CACs can be “retrofit-
ted” if necessary, but a significant amount 
of it is not .
• Case-by-case sustainability analyses are 
part of the negotiation, and not predictable . 
As such, they do not help with the ex-ante 
distortions, particularly when declaring a 
country insolvent remains an unattractive 
option in light of the restructuring barriers 
that remain even with euro-CACs .
A possible solution might be to reform the new-
ly introduced euro-CACs in a way that they allow 
aggregation across bond series, without bond-by-
bond voting . However, even if this happened, it 
will take another 5 to 10 years until they will be 
contained in the majority of euro area sovereign 
bonds . Until then, there will be a mixed regime of 
pre-2013 bonds (mostly without CACs) and post-
2013 bonds (with euro-CACs) . And even in 10 
years, it is not clear whether euro-CACs would ever 
be used, as the decision to withhold ESM support 
and encourage countries to restructure remains 
29  The aggregate voting threshold is higher than in the Greek “retrofit” CAC (75 rather than 66 .67 percent) . Furthermore, euro-CACs require at 
least a 66 .67 percent vote in each individual bond issuance, while in Greece it was sufficient to reach this threshold in aggregate .
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discretionary, and may or may not be optimal ex 
post . This is far from the regime that Europe needs 
to both succeed in future restructurings and create 
good incentives ex ante .
Is a Debt Restructuring Regime 
Redundant? 
After the obvious failure of the fiscal (and macro-
economic) framework, the EU and the euro area 
embarked on a large-scale effort to strengthen its 
governance . In particular, the so-called six-pack 
(i .e ., six regulations designed to strengthen fiscal 
discipline and macroeconomic surveillance) was 
adopted by all EU member states in 2011; an in-
tergovernmental treaty (Treaty on Stability, Coor-
dination, and Governance), also called the “fiscal 
compact,” was signed by 25 EU member states in 
2012; and two further regulations (the “two-pack”) 
entered into force in the countries of the euro area 
in 2013 .30
Together, these new regulations have substantially 
changed the governance of the euro area . On the 
fiscal side, for instance, excessive deficit procedures 
may now be launched on the basis of a debt ratio 
above 60 percent of GDP that does not diminish 
sufficiently rapidly . The debt reduction path must 
follow a numerical benchmark, and progressive 
financial sanctions kick in at earlier stages than 
previously . The fiscal compact further reinforces 
fiscal targets, mandates their implementation in 
national law—preferably at the constitutional lev-
el—and gives the European Court of Justice the 
right to monitor the implementation of the law 
and impose sanction for noncompliance . Further-
more, the ESM is barred from lending to countries 
that violate the fiscal compact, giving countries a 
further incentive to keep their fiscal house in order; 
by the same token, the presence of the ESM should 
not cause incentives to engage in fiscal profligacy . 
Finally, the two-pack introduces EU-level budget 
monitoring and coordination through a common 
budgetary time line and procedures . For the euro 
area countries, the commission will now examine 
and give an opinion on the draft budget, and may 
ask for the submission of a revised plan . 
With all these new instruments and powers, one 
could conclude that the euro area is already suf-
ficiently equipped to ensure fiscal discipline and 
prevent repeated debt crisis . However, this conclu-
sion would be premature, for two reasons .
First, although the fiscal compact mandates fis-
cal rectitude and prohibits the ESM from helping 
countries that do not comply (after an adjustment 
period, agreed on country by country), it does not 
provide any alternative instruments for dealing 
with a debt crisis . This means that if a country does 
not follow the rules and a crisis does arise, Euro-
pean policymakers will again be caught between 
a rock and a hard place . If they reject a country’s 
call for support, they will likely force it into a debt 
restructuring, but without tools that legitimize the 
restructuring and ensure its orderliness . This may 
again lead to pressures to make an exception and 
allow the ESM to lend to the country after all—
very similar to the pressures that led the IMF, for 
example, to change its exceptional access criteria 
in order to enable it to lend to Greece . 
Second, the most of the new rules aim at im-
proving discipline in fiscal terms . Although the 
six-pack also introduces a new macroeconom-
ic imbalance procedure, which together with the 
European Systemic Risk Board is to monitor and 
prevent excessive risk taking in the financial and in 
the private sector .  However, this may not be suffi-
cient to rule out situations where a country’s debt 
becomes unsustainable because of the accumula-
tion or “discovery” of quasi-fiscal liabilities which 
become fiscal in a crisis . 
30  See European Commission, “Six-Pack? Two-Pack? Fiscal Compact? A Short Guide to the New EU Fiscal Governance,” http://ec .europa .
eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en .htm . The ESM treaty and the fiscal compact (“Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination, and Governance”) are also available on the European Commission’s Web site .
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Building a debt restructuring framework for Eu-
rope on top of its existing fiscal governance would 
at worst be costless and at best essential . If the new 
rules do indeed ensure that the debt of all euro area 
members declines to below 60 percent of GDP and 
remains there, the restructuring regime would 
serve as a second line of defense that may never 
be breached . The probability of a debt restructur-
ing in such a case would be minimal, and so would 
be any impact of a debt restructuring regime on 
borrowing costs . If, conversely, the new rules do 
not work as intended—as may be the case if euro 
area countries are not able or willing to live up to 
their new commitments, or if their debts become 
unsustainable for reasons outside the new fiscal 
rules—a debt restructuring regime would harness 
market discipline in normal times and provide a 
safety valve in crisis times .
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What Should A Reform Achieve? 
Ideally, to meet the objectives outlined in the pre-
vious sections, a debt restructuring regime would 
meet four conditions:
• Address the ex-ante problem of mispric-
ing of risk and overborrowing through a 
predictable regime that sets transparent 
criteria for sovereign restructuring and 
limits the scope of official sector involve-
ment;
• Make sovereign debt restructuring in 
unsustainable debt cases politically and 
legally legitimate—removing the stigma 
that contributed to the misdiagnosis of the 
Greek case, for example;
• Provide a crisis management framework 
that reduces the economic cost and sys-
temic financial risks of debt restructuring 
to manageable levels, both in the country 
that restructures and in countries with ex-
posures to the restructuring country; and
• Deal with the holdout problem ex post .
The first three conditions are as critical (or more 
so) as the fourth one . Unless they are met, debt-
or countries will continue to be subject to creditor 
runs . In the case of the euro area, even a legally 
coherent statutory mechanism along the lines of 
the IMF’s 2003 SDRM proposal would not work, 
simply because the debtor countries would not in-
voke it because of fear of stigma and economic col-
lapse; and the other euro area countries, the ECB 
and other EU authorities would oppose its use for 
fear of contagion and legal challenge . 
Given the plethora of sovereign debt problems 
presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4, the first and best 
approach to addressing these problems would pre-
sumably be fully fledged international sovereign 
insolvency–cum–crisis management regime that 
is capable of dealing with many inefficiencies at 
once . But such a regime is practically and politi-
cally unfeasible . In light of this, we structure the 
remainder of the discussion as follows:
• At the global level, the main difficulty is to 
obtain a critical level of political support 
for institutional or legal reform that would 
have consequences in most if not all major 
international jurisdictions . In light of this, 
we review several reform options that are 
increasingly more ambitious and deliver 
better solutions at the price of requiring 
a greater degree of consensus across gov-
ernments .
• In the euro area, creating or modifying 
common institutions is far less taboo . 
CHAPTER 5:  Policy Proposals for the Euro Area 
and Beyond
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Indeed, a treaty-based sovereign insolven-
cy regime in Europe would pale in com-
parison with some of the dramatic insti-
tutional changes in the euro area that have 
already been made or are in the process 
of being negotiated—starting, of course, 
with the common currency itself, and 
more recently comprising the creation 
of the ESM, the fiscal compact, and the 
Banking Union . The challenge lies in the 
details of how to design such a regime, and 
particularly in how to manage the transi-
tion from the present crisis, when expec-
tations of debt restructuring could easily 
turn out to be self-fulfilling, including in 
countries where it may be better to reduce 
debt levels through a combination of ad-
justment and economic recovery rather 
than through restructuring .
International Solutions
At the international level, we distinguish three re-
form options .
• The first two are aimed exclusively at the 
holdout problem . We distinguish between 
a purely contractual approach (Option 1), 
and limited statutory reform (Option 2) . 
Neither is likely to have a major impact on 
incentives to overborrow or on the “too 
little too late” problem with regard to debt 
restructuring .
• The third alternative is somewhat more 
ambitious, and would involve the IMF . 
It would both address the holdout prob-
lem and could have a limited impact on 
incentives more broadly—particularly the 
problem that countries tend to restructure 
too little . 
Getting Serious about Aggregation
As briefly described in the previous chapter, euro 
area nations have introduced an aggregation fea-
ture in all new sovereign bond contracts that would 
make it more difficult for holdouts to obtain block-
ing majorities in individual bonds . Specifically, the 
supermajority threshold that needs to be obtained 
in order to restructure individual bonds is lower if 
there is a large supermajority across all bonds that 
favors the restructuring .
In the post-Argentina/NML world, these aggrega-
tion features may not go nearly far enough, partic-
ularly in a global context . Individual bond series 
of smaller countries can be so small (and cheap, 
in a distressed debt case) to be easily purchased by 
prospective holdouts in their entirety . To deal with 
these holdouts, modest trade-offs between super-
majorities at the aggregate and the individual bond 
levels are unlikely to be sufficient . Instead, what 
might be needed is an aggregation mechanism 
along the lines used in the Greek restructuring of 
2012, which allowed for the restructuring of indi-
vidual bonds issued under Greek law even against 
the wishes of the majority of holders of that bond, 
provided that the restructuring was backed by a 
supermajority of bondholders across all bonds .31 
In the case of Greece, what mattered was only the 
aggregate support for the proposed restructur-
ing; that is, the wishes of the holders of individual 
Greek law bond series were not even considered . 
In the context of the Greek restructuring offer, 
which went out of its way to avoid discriminating 
against bondholders that chose to vote against the 
proposed restructuring,32 this was both effective 
and arguably fair .
In a more general setting, one needs to be careful 
to avoid a contractual change that could enable the 
expropriation of a minority of creditors—that is, 
31 Namely, 66 .67 percent of face value, provided bondholders representing a least 50 percent of face value participated in the vote .
32 For the details, see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, and Gulati (2013) .
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a situation where a supermajority of creditors at-
tempts to extract a disproportionate haircut from a 
minority (e .g ., the creditors in a small bond issue) . 
To avoid this, two avenues are conceivable: 
• The conventional approach is to seek con-
sent at both the aggregate level and, for 
each individual bond series, albeit with 
lower majority thresholds, at the individu-
al series level . As argued above, the prob-
lem with this approach is that it allows 
holdouts to concentrate their holdings in 
some of the smaller bond issues, where 
they can block at least a portion of the re-
structuring . 
• A better approach would be to require 
a separate “per series” vote only in cases 
where the terms of the proposed restruc-
turing are not uniformly applicable across 
all the series of bonds . This “uniformly ap-
plicable” requirement should prevent an 
issuer from colluding with the holders of 
certain series to discriminate against oth-
ers .33 
Getting serious about aggregation in the man-
ner described in the second approach would be 
a significant departure from existing practice in 
the drafting of bond contracts . Experience tells 
us that coordinating marketwide changes in con-
tracting practices can both be difficult and slow, 
even where there is widespread agreement regard-
ing the welfare benefits of such a move . For this 
reason, strong aggregation features are unlikely 
to come about spontaneously . If the shift to ag-
gregation must occur quickly, there will probably 
need to be a significant dose of official sector en-
couragement, as there was with the CAC initiative 
in the New York law market in 2002–03 .34 Even 
greater coordination would be needed to include 
aggregation features in the existing stock of bonds, 
because this would require debt exchanges of exist-
ing bond series against otherwise identical bonds 
with aggregation provisions .
A Limited Statutory Reform
As described in chapter 3, holdouts in Argentina’s 
debt restructuring have found a way of inflicting 
major collateral damage by threatening the con-
duits of payments to creditors under performing 
debt contracts . Thus the attack targets trustees, 
payments and clearing systems around the world .
The countermeasure would be to adopt legislation 
immunizing all payment and clearing systems in 
large financial centers, much as Belgium immu-
nized Euroclear from creditor injunctions in re-
sponse to Elliott’s lawsuit against Peru:
Any cash settlement account maintained with 
the operator of a system or with a cash settlement 
agent, as well as any cash transfer, through a Bel-
gian or foreign credit institution to be credited to 
such cash settlement account, cannot be attached, 
put under sequestration or otherwise blocked by 
any means by a participant (other than the oper-
ator or the settlement agent), a counterpart or a 
third party . (Euroclear translation of Belgian Act 
of April 28, 1999, as amended by Act of Novem-
ber 19, 2004) 
It would be sufficient to coordinate and adopt sub-
stantively the same legislation for a handful of fi-
nancial centers in which most sovereign bonds are 
issued and traded . Immunizing market infrastruc-
ture from holdouts would increase the attractive-
ness of financial centers adopting this measure, be-
cause it would reduce the likelihood of disruption 
from lawsuits against participants or beneficiaries . 
This limited reform might provide a global solu-
tion to the problem of holdouts emboldened by the 
prospects of third-party enforcement . But it would 
only serve to reestablish the balance of power that 
33   “Uniformly applicable” does not necessarily mean that all bonds series would have to be transformed into an identical instrument or bundle of 
instruments . E .g ., a uniform extension of the maturity of all series by five years, or a reduction of all coupons by 1 percentage point, or by 20 
percent, would also constitute a “uniform applicable” change .
34 For the details, see Gelpern and Gulati (2006); and Bradley and Gulati (2012) .
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existed before NML v. Argentina . It would not ad-
dress incentives to overborrow, to procrastinate 
and to restructure too little, too late . 
This solution could be implemented through 
changes in the relevant law as of major financial 
centers . Presumably, such legislation would pres-
ent a competitive advantage of the first moving fi-
nancial center because it would attract trading and 
payment business to that location . However, for 
the same reason some coordination and harmoni-
zation of immunization policies may be desirable .
An IMF-Based Sovereign Debt 
Adjustment Program 
The two proposals so far have the advantage that 
they do not create new international institutions 
(or change the rules of existing ones) or require 
new treaties or treaty changes . But by requiring 
less, they also achieve less . Because they focus only 
on the holdout problem, they would not address 
the incentives to overborrow and procrastinate 
that relate to the moral hazard caused by inter-
national bailouts, political economy and the oth-
er distortions discussed in chapter 2 . Hence, they 
would not have much of an impact on strengthen-
ing incentives ex ante .
To make progress in this area—and to deal with 
the holdout problem at the same time—it is nec-
essary to both make it more difficult for govern-
ments to postpone necessary debt restructurings 
by resorting to international official borrowing, 
and to make the restructuring process less risky 
and more predictable . At the international level, 
the only practical way of achieving that is through 
a modification of the way in which the IMF assists 
countries with debt burdens that run a significant 
risk of being unsustainable . 
In principle, the IMF’s internal rules forbid the 
Fund from lending to such countries even now . In 
practice, however, these rules were overruled or 
reinterpreted to enable the Fund to lend in cases 
such as Greece . Part of the reason for the pressure 
to do so is that international crisis lending, com-
bined with domestic adjustment and reform, is 
currently “the only game in town” when the official 
community attempts to help countries in a debt 
crisis . The IMF can offer this traditional package, 
or offer nothing .
To address this problem, and to effectively give the 
IMF a second instrument for assisting high-debt 
countries, a dedicated IMF lending facility could 
be created, which we refer to as the Sovereign Debt 
Adjustment Facility (SDAF) .35 It would serve two 
main—related—purposes: to create a stronger 
commitment device for the Fund not to be drawn 
into bailing out countries whose debts are likely 
unsustainable unless these countries also restruc-
ture; and to protect countries that undertake or-
derly restructurings in the context of the SDAF 
from holdouts .
Criteria. To qualify for IMF access under an SDAF, 
the country would need to be in a situation where 
debt sustainability is no longer assured without 
substantial debt relief . The Fund would have to 
establish criteria under which countries would 
be eligible for an SDAF in a similar fashion as the 
criteria that were established for qualification un-
der the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative . Like in the HIPC initiative, it will be 
necessary to have a multidimensional scheme (us-
ing a combination of debt-level and vulnerability 
indicators)—which would, however, be defined 
ex ante . Countries that fall under the criteria de-
termined by this scheme would not have access to 
IMF crisis lending except under the SDAF .
35 This section is draws on proposals by Broomfield and Buchheit (2013) and Panizza (2013) .
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This would imply a shift from the status quo, 
where debt sustainability assessments are case by 
case and tend to be relevant only after the fact, that 
is, when the country has almost lost market access . 
The advantage of such an approach is that it would 
bind the IMF ex ante and would remove the pro-
cess of establishing debt sustainability from the ne-
gotiation process, and would also avoid the som-
ersaults that happened in the case of the Greece . 
The disadvantage, of course, is that it would not be 
easy to establish criteria for lending in debt adjust-
ment and restructuring cases that applied across 
countries . 
A variant that addresses the problem of defining 
ex-ante criteria that will “fit” all countries might 
work as follows . SDAF criteria would still be es-
tablished, but instead of tying any IMF lending 
to a debt restructuring, they would trigger a two-
step procedure .36 In the first step, a country would 
have the option of requesting a traditional adjust-
ment program, on the condition of defining coun-
try-specific criteria that would, if they are trig-
gered, prevent the Fund from extending further 
assistance without debt relief—which would be the 
second step . This proposal would address the pres-
ence of a “gray area” in which predefined criteria 
raise doubts about the lack of debt sustainability, 
but the country argues (and IMF staff might agree) 
that these criteria are too coarse and insufficiently 
country specific, and that adjustment could poten-
tially rectify the situation without a debt restruc-
turing . The essential difference between this vari-
ant of the SDAF and the status quo is that, under 
its current rules, once programs go off track the 
Fund has broad leeway to adjust conditionality 
and continue lending . Under an SDAF, this leeway 
would be restricted to support programs that em-
bed a debt restructuring .
The trigger of the process would continue to be in 
the hands of the debtor country . The country would 
request an SDAF in the way in which it currently 
requests other forms of IMF support . If the Fund 
accepts the country’s request, it would prepare a 
draft Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA), which 
sets out the macroeconomic adjustments as well as 
the contributions expected from the debtors mul-
tilateral, bilateral and private creditors (in the two-
step variant discussed above, this would become 
relevant in the second step) . In preparing a DSA, 
the Fund would be guided by the principle of equi-
table burden sharing among all classes of creditors 
except for recognized exceptions such as multilat-
eral financial institutions and, where appropriate, 
trade/supplier creditors, short-term treasury bill 
holders and similar categories .
The draft DSA would be discussed with the debtor 
countries’ authorities and comments could also be 
invited from creditors, citizens of the debtor coun-
try and civil society groups . If an agreement were 
to be reached between the debtor country and the 
IMF, the process would proceed in a manner con-
sistent with the final DSA . 
Restructuring. The debtor country would approach 
each creditor group, creditor committee or similar 
body and seek debt relief consistent in a net present 
value sense with the assumptions of the final DSA . 
The draft DSA would be posted on a publicly avail-
able Web site, and interested parties (creditors, citi-
zens of the debtor country and civil society groups) 
would be invited to comment . If thought appropri-
ate, the staff of the IMF could invite interested par-
ties to present their views in person .
Following discussions with each affected credi-
tor class, the debtor country would formulate the 
terms of its restructuring proposal with each cred-
itor group holding claims that would be eligible to 
participate in the restructuring (eligible claims) . 
The IMF would review each of these proposals 
to ensure that it would be, in a net present value 
sense, not more burdensome to the creditor that 
shall be required by the assumptions of the DSA . 
36 See Panizza (2012) .
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The restructuring could be subject to superma-
jority creditor control by requiring the support of 
holders of at least 75 percent of the affected debt 
instruments .
“Defanging” Holdouts . Holdouts could be dealt 
with by immunizing, in all IMF member coun-
tries, the assets and revenue streams of the debt-
or country against attachment by the holder of a 
debt instrument that was invited to participate in 
a Fund-approved SDAF but declined to do so . This 
would be similar to the limited reform discussed in 
the last section in the sense that it would immunize 
the payment streams rather than limiting creditor 
rights directly . It would essentially simply add a 
new category to the immunities that most coun-
tries already recognize for foreign state property . 
The reform could be implemented through a 
change in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF: 
Article VIII 2 (a) of the IMFs Articles of Agreement 
could be amended by adding the following text: 
“Any such restrictions imposed by a member in accor-
dance with a Sovereign Debt Adjustment Program 
(as defined below) approved by the Fund shall for 
the purposes of this Article VIII 2(a), be deemed ap-
proved by the Fund. The assets and revenue streams 
of a member that has implemented a Sovereign Debt 
Adjustment Program approved by the Fund shall not 
be subject to any form of attachment garnishment, 
execution, injunctive relief or similar form of judicial 
process in the territories of any member in connec-
tion with an Eligible Claim Contract (defined below) 
for which the holder elects not to participate in that 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Program.
“Sovereign Debt Adjustment Program,” with refer-
ence to a class of creditors, means a debt adjustment 
program of a member that (i) is designed and imple-
mented in a manner consistent with the Executive 
Board’s decision taken at its meeting on ____ __, 
2014 (“Fund Policy with Respect to Members’ Debt 
Restructuring Initiatives”), as that Policy may be 
amended or supplemented by the Executive Board 
from time to time and (ii) in which the holders of 
at least 75% (measured by principal amount) of the 
Eligible Claim Contracts of that class have elected to 
participate. (“Eligible Claim Contracts” means con-
tracts relating to debt instruments that are eligible 
to participate in a Sovereign Debt Adjustment Pro-
gram approved by the Fund.)
The SDAF has some commonalities with the IMF’s 
2003 SDRM proposal, which also attempted to 
find a way of dealing with holdouts with the con-
sent of a supermajority of creditors . There are two 
main differences: 
• From a legal perspective, the SDAF would 
be much less intrusive than the SDRM 
proposed by the IMF in 2002–3 . Unlike 
the SDRM, there would not be no auto-
matic stay of litigation; no tribunal to hear 
disputes between the debtor and its cred-
itors; and no mechanism for binding all 
creditors to the will of the supermajority . 
Holdouts would retain their claims, but 
could not expect to satisfy them by at-
tempting (through judicial mechanisms) 
to seize the property of the debtor state 
held in the territory of a member .
• From an economic perspective, the main 
emphasis of the SDAF, unlike the SDRM, 
would be to establish a commitment de-
vice that would preclude the Fund from 
financing countries with doubtful debt 
sustainability . In its two-step variant, the 
SDAF would essentially constitute a struc-
tured learning process, which, in the first 
step, would give the benefit of the doubt 
to traditional adjustment, but where debt 
restructuring would become a binding re-
quirement after an initial adjustment at-
tempt failed . 
A European Solution 
As discussed in the previous section, a sover-
eign debt resolution regime that deals with both 
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ex-ante and ex-post distortions is both more im-
portant and more realistic for the euro area than 
a comprehensive solution may be at the global 
level . Moreover, it could serve as a benchmark 
for any future global approaches . One advantage 
of the euro area is that there already exists a fiscal 
framework with debt thresholds that define fiscal 
solidity, to which all member countries have made 
a commitment . A European Sovereign Debt Re-
structuring Regime (ESDRR) needs to tie into this 
framework . Furthermore, for reasons of legitima-
cy and to be able to manage the collateral damage 
of debt restructuring, an ESDRR would need to be 
incorporated into the broader European crisis re-
sponse framework . 
A European Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Regime for the Long 
Run
It is important to stress that our proposal for an 
ESDRR is not meant as to remedy the ongoing sov-
ereign crisis . The ESDRR is a regime for the long 
run; its main purpose is to set incentives against 
excessive public (and indirectly also private) debt 
accumulation . To address the problems of the 
present debt overhang, creative and more flexible 
solutions will be needed (although such solutions 
could borrow our proposal’s approach to the ex-
post problem—that is, shielding sovereigns from 
holdouts if additional debt restructurings were to 
become necessary) . The special difficulty in mar-
rying the short and the long run is that incentives 
for adjustment now and prevention thereafter need 
to be aligned . Here, we present a European Debt 
Redemption Pact as a proposal that addresses the 
short-run problems and could serve as a bridge to 
the long-run ESDRR described here . 
The proposed regime deals with two problems: 
1 . The ex-ante problem—by conditioning 
official lending on a restructuring regime 
and by designing the “when, how and how 
much” debt restructuring that is to be ex-
pected; and
2 . The ex-post problem of immunizing the 
restructuring against holdouts .
The Vehicle.37 The ESDRR would be based on the 
European Stability Mechanism and take the form 
of a change in the ESM treaty to the effect of (1) 
conditioning ESM lending to certain debt thresh-
olds and (2) preventing holdouts in ESM-sanc-
tioned debt restructurings from enforcing their 
claims through European courts . At the same time, 
both the restructuring country and “innocent by-
standers” would need to have access to ESM lend-
ing to deal with the fallout of a restructuring . 
Conditioning ESM Lending on Debt 
Thresholds 
As noted above, the euro area already has a fiscal 
framework embodying a definition of fiscal solidi-
ty, which revolves around the debt level of 60 per-
cent . Our regime ties into this framework by using 
the 60 percent level as the threshold for condition-
ing official crisis lending by the ESM .38 At debt lev-
els below 60 percent, ESM lending would be large-
ly unconditional . At 60 percent plus x (i .e ., the up-
per threshold), ESM lending would be conditional 
on debt restructuring . In the intermediate space 
(between 60 percent and the upper threshold), the 
status quo regime of “constructive ambiguity” or 
“restructure only if absolutely needed” would re-
main . The effect would be to limit the range within 
37  This section is based on Buchheit, Gulati, and Tirado (2012); Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2010); and German Council of Economic 
Experts (2012) .
38  A related proposal that uses the 60 percent threshold (without a buffer zone) is the blue/red bold proposal by von Weiszäcker and Delpla 
(2010): Financing above 60 percent debt (with red bond) would be at risk of restructuring, whereas below 60 percent a joint and mutual 
guarantee would make restructuring highly unlikely .
R EVIS ITI nG SoVE R E IG n BAn kR U PTCY  
36
which the official sector is incentivized in order to 
gamble for resurrection and create moral hazard 
on the side of private creditors, but at the same 
time provide enough flexibility to accommodate 
large economic shocks . 
Of course, there are several potential problems in 
using a particular debt threshold to define the re-
structuring regime: 
• A debt threshold is an imperfect measure 
of solvency . It could lead to errors on both 
sides: Debts might be unsustainable even 
though the threshold is not reached, and 
some countries’ debts might be sustain-
able even though they exceed the thresh-
old . From the point of view of minimizing 
such errors, it would be better to opt ei-
ther for country-specific debt limits or for 
much more complex rules that take into 
account off-balance-sheet items, consid-
erations regarding the denominator (GDP 
vs . gross national product—the latter is 20 
percent lower in Ireland than the former), 
the net international investment position, 
growth prospects due to demography and 
structural factors and, last but not least, 
political ability and a willingness to tax . 
• A further consideration is that simple 
rules may not help credibility, if they turn 
out to be so inefficient ex post that the 
political system will find a way around 
them . The debt and deficit limits embed-
ded in the Maastricht Treaty are a case in 
point . Furthermore, as in all cases when 
numbers become targets, conditioning on 
debt thresholds may create incentives to 
manipulate these statistics (“Goodhart’s 
Law”) . 
• Finally, tying officially sanctioned debt 
restructuring to just one solvency mea-
sure—a debt threshold—might distort 
country policies in ways that create vul-
nerabilities through other channels . In 
particular, it might create incentives to 
reduce debt costs through reliance on rel-
atively cheap short-term financing—par-
ticularly when debt limits approach the 
upper threshold . This would be akin to 
gambling for redemption, encouraged by 
the fact that if excessively short-term debt 
were to trigger a liquidity crisis, the EMS 
would be there to help without necessarily 
requiring a debt restructuring—so long as 
total debt was below the threshold .
Although these are important concerns, we believe 
that they are either mitigated by the European 
situation or can be addressed with the proposed 
framework, as follows . 
First, country-specific debt limits or complex sol-
vency formulas are not desirable, for a number of 
reasons . The more complex the formula, the hard-
er it would be to agree ex ante, and the greater the 
scope for manipulation ex post, undermining its 
credibility . Country-specific debt limits, converse-
ly—for example, higher limits for countries that 
are deemed to have better institutions or more 
flexible economies, or possibly have historically 
shouldered larger debts—would not be accepted in 
Europe on equal treatment grounds and would be 
inconsistent with the logic of euro area member-
ship, which carries the assumption of and commit-
ment to convergence . Therefore, the economic pa-
rameters and fiscal threshold should be the same 
for all countries in the long-run equilibrium . 
This leaves the euro area with a simple choice: 
to adopt simple ex-ante rules that constrain dis-
cretion when structuring ESM-led rescues, or to 
adopt no rules . Given the biases that currently 
exist against any form of debt restructuring (see 
chapter 4), pure discretion would lead to bigger 
errors than simple rules . This, in a nutshell, is the 
main argument for the proposed approach .
Second, analogies between the lack of credibility 
of debt limits in the original Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) and the debt limits as proposed here 
ignore the fundamentally different nature of these 
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limits . In the context of the SGP, the limits were 
supposed to bind sovereign nations—a tall order, 
particularly with regard to powerful countries such 
as Germany and France, which in 2003 colluded to 
prevent the enforcement of the rules . Writing the 
charter of an official lender in a way that denies 
a country that has broken a debt ceiling finance 
is not the same—and is much more credible—as 
prohibiting that country from breaking the ceiling . 
Furthermore, the chance that euro area countries 
would collude to change the ESM rules is much 
lower . In particular, unlike the violation of the SGP 
limits, there is no sense that countries like Germa-
ny and France might benefit tomorrow by accept-
ing a breach of the rule by another country today .
What about fears that debt/GDP numbers could be 
manipulated?39 While this can never be ruled out, 
it is arguably less of an issue in the EU today than 
before, or internationally . Debt/GDP numbers are 
already enshrined in the fiscal framework and are 
closely monitored by the European Commission . 
One of the lessons of the euro debt crisis was to 
award Eurostat more powers to monitor countries’ 
debt statistics and to close loopholes as they emerge 
(e .g ., by defining the treatment of financial deriva-
tives or of the liabilities of government-sponsored 
bad banks) . Therefore, the risks of implicit debt are 
within the scope of the monitoring process in the 
EU at various levels . In addition to Eurostat, the 
European Systemic Risk Board and the Single Su-
pervisory Mechanisms have a mandate to monitor 
contingent liabilities in the private and financial 
sectors . Also, as noted above, while a European 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime will not by 
itself solve the private sector’s debt problems, it 
may well ameliorate them; markets will be more 
likely to “price” sovereign default risks regardless 
of whether these originate from sovereign debt or 
from socialized private debt . This should give in-
centives to sovereigns to worry more about credit 
booms that could give rise to quasi-fiscal liabilities . 
This leaves one potentially serious source of un-
intended consequences: the possibility that focus-
ing all attention on just one number could invite 
misbehavior along other dimensions that carry no 
weight under the rules . However, there are ways to 
address this problem . In particular, greater use of 
short-term debt could be penalized by imposing 
the rule that in the event of a debt restructuring, 
haircuts on short-term debt will be higher than on 
longer maturities . At debt levels below 60 percent 
(where ESM lending is not conditional on fiscal 
adjustment and restructurings are excluded), the 
existing SGP criteria may need to be supplement-
ed by a limit on the ratio of short- to long-term 
debt .
 
The long-run regime-governing debt restructurings 
in the euro area would be defined through the lend-
ing policies of the ESM, in the following manner: 
1. Below 60 percent debt, access to the ESM is 
almost unconditional, in the sense that the 
ESM would not require fiscal adjustment 
or debt restructuring, except for a limit on 
short-term debt. Other types of conditional-
ity may still apply, particularly in banking 
crises. 
39  In defining public debt one crucial distinction is between gross and net debt (see, e .g ., Panizza and Presbitero 2013): Net government debt is 
normally obtained by subtracting the financial assets held by the government from gross debt . Differences between gross and net debt can be 
very large . At the end of 2012, average gross debt in countries that belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development was 
close to 110 percent of the group’s GDP, but net debt was almost 40 percentage points lower than gross debt . Large differences between net and 
gross debt are sometimes due to the fact that the government holds a large fraction of its own debt . For instance, part of the U .S . government 
debt is held in the U .S . Social Security Trust Fund . Therefore, U .S . statistical sources often mention a measure of debt (“debt held by the public”) 
that nets out these cross-holdings, and it is thus similar to a concept of net debt . In other cases, large difference between gross and net debt arise 
from the accumulation of international reserves or the presence of sovereign wealth funds . Calculating net debt requires a precise evaluation of 
government’s assets and liabilities . This is a difficult exercise . Even netting cross-holdings of public sector bonds by separate public entities, and 
between national and subnational governments is not a simple exercise . Netting out cross-holdings of government assets also requires adjusting 
debt ratios for the liabilities associated with these cross-holdings . As a consequence, each country has its own definition of net debt which 
makes the statistic useless for cross country comparison . The EU defines government debt as used in the Maastricht criteria as gross debt and 
mandates Eurostat is to ensure a homogenous application of the definition across countries .
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2. Between 60 percent and an upper thresh-
old, access to the ESM is conditional on 
and fiscal adjustment and structural con-
ditionality. Debt restructuring would not be 
expected unless a debt sustainability analy-
sis suggested that it is needed. In case of re-
structuring, debt of short maturities would 
be subject to a heavier haircut. 
3. Above the upper threshold, access to 
ESM support is only be possible with an 
ESM-sanctioned debt restructuring pro-
gram. The minimal extent of restructuring 
should be such that the countries debt level 
falls below the upper threshold with a safety 
margin. 
Setting the Upper Threshold. In deciding where to 
set the higher threshold, there needs to be a balance 
between allowing flexibility and limiting overbor-
rowing (see box 3) . Countries that appear fiscally 
sound may experience sudden and large surges in 
debt levels during crises . Sudden debt jumps are 
most often the consequence of the eruption of a 
banking crisis, a natural disaster, or a war . Contin-
gent debt from the financial system was the cause 
of the spectacular increase in debt levels (e .g ., in 
Iceland or Ireland) . In the future architecture of the 
euro area, such increases in debt due to banking li-
abilities should be mitigated by a common regime 
for bank restructuring and resolution . 
The function of the threshold is to bind the hands 
of the euro area to share the burden with credi-
tors in high-debt cases . A very low threshold is 
not desirable since it might trigger restructurings 
even in cases of temporary shocks . But a very high 
threshold would imply that the adjustment bur-
den falls only on the shoulders of debtor countries 
(and possibly those of official lenders, if their loans 
are not repaid) . For the financial architecture of 
the euro area, a very high threshold would imply 
that that the restructuring regime remains irrele-
vant . The present situation would persist even in 
the long run . Bail-ins would remain unlikely and 
unpredictable . 
Of particular importance, the upper threshold 
would not necessarily act as an automatic re-
structuring trigger, nor as universal debt ceiling . 
It might be possible for a country to carry debt 
above the threshold if it could retain market con-
fidence . But even if markets are willing to provide 
the finance, this does not necessarily mean that it 
is optimal to carry very high debt . 
There are cases of countries with very high debt 
levels (above 100 or even 200 percent of GDP) 
that do not seem to be in danger of losing mar-
ket access . But these are likely special cases where 
national savers and financial intermediaries are 
prepared to sustain these debt levels .40 In the euro 
area, the zone of vulnerability now seems to be 
much lower, or else Italy would not be considered 
a problem . Furthermore, given the demograph-
ics and relatively low potential growth prospects 
of advanced countries, it seems hard to argue that 
very high debt levels are optimal from a growth 
perspective (let alone from the intergenerational 
distribution perspective) . 
Fixing the upper debt ceiling will require further 
research, but a number that is about 1 .5 times the 
lower ceiling seems reasonable .
Rules for Restructuring. Two rules would gov-
ern the amount and form of restructuring: (1) The 
minimum amount of restructuring should bring 
the debt level below the upper threshold; and (2) 
shorter maturity debt would receive a heavier 
haircut . Guidelines for the equitable treatment of 
various creditor classes would also apply, as de-
scribed in the context of the SDAF proposed for 
the IMF .
The Policy Framework “Ties the Hands” of the 
ESM (and the Troika), since they no longer exercise 
40 For an analysis of the Japanese case, see Hoshi and Ito (2013) .
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box 3. episodes oF surges in public debt From 60 percent 
While the lower threshold of 60 percent is generally accepted in the European Union, the upper threshold 
will be more contentious . After all, at present most EU members, as well as most other advanced econ-
omies, have debt levels of about 90 to 100 percent . Are they all to be considered “restructuring cases”? 
First, it is important to stress again that the policies proposed in this section are for the long run (i .e ., in 
a situation when the legacy of this crisis has been dealt with; see below) . Second, we can ask how many 
episodes there have been where debt levels increased from below 60 percent to 90 percent, and how 
may years this process has taken in the past . Table 2 uses historical gross debt data from the IMF from 
1880 to 2010 . We identify a total of 20 events in 15 countries, four of them in the euro area . Most epi-
sodes of surges in debt from 60 (or below) to 90 (or above) did play out over several years . On average, 
such an increase in debt took almost 6 .5 years . 
table 2. episodes oF surges in debt/gdp From 60 percent to 90 percent 
Start End Start End Years
Argentina 36.2 90.6 1887 1891 5
Argentina 57.7 100.7 1927 1931 5
Australia 59.7 98.2 1927 1932 6
Canada 53.2 102.3 1929 1932 4
Canada 58.4 90.2 1982 1992 10
Chile 47.6 108.3 1971 1975 4
Chile 34.0 117.5 1982 1984 3
Greece 48.2 120.0 1886 1888 3
Greece 60.0 100.5 1989 1992 5
Iceland 29.1 92.8 2007 2010 4
Indonesia 26.4 95.9 1997 1999 3
Ireland 59.8 93.2 1981 1988 8
Ireland 44.3 92.2 2008 2010 3
Italy 58.5 90.8 1981 1988 8
Japan 57.2 95.9 1981 1996 15
Malaysia 52.7 106.3 1981 1986 5
Portugal 57.5 93.3 2004 2010 6
Singapore 59.7 94.8 1981 2001 19
United States 57.1 98.6 2002 2010 8
Uruguay 34.6 99.9 1982 1984 3
Average 49.6 99.1 6, 4
Note: Advanced or emerging market economies, 1880–2010 .
Source: IMF .
We also conducted a similar exercise in which we identified episodes during which debt levels increased 
by 30 percent in one or two years irrespective of the starting level of debt . As expected, such extreme 
episodes tend to be associated with severe economic dislocations like those in the 1920s and 1930s, or 
with twin or triple crises . Overall, however, such debt jumps occurred at initial debt levels above 60 
percent . The average starting level of all episodes was 84 percent, and the median was 70 percent .
 
Overall, the experience of advanced and emerging market economies of the last 130 years suggests that an 
upper threshold of debt/GDP between 90 and 100 percent would be enough to provide an adequate buffer 
during which adjustment can take place without markets having to worry about debt restructuring . 
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discretion in times of distress . The advantage of 
such a framework is that it provides strong ex-an-
te incentives to discipline fiscal policies while at the 
same time narrowing the space within which re-
structurings and official interventions are possible . 
To be effective in the sense of creating a genuine 
commitment device, the ESDRR would need to 
rule out access to IMF resources as a way of cir-
cumventing ESM access and restructurings in high 
debt cases . An easy way of achieving this would be 
to pool euro area membership at the IMF . 
By construction, the ESDRR would be binding for 
countries of the euro area (since they are members 
of the ESM treaty) . It may be possible to find ways 
for other EU member countries to join this regime 
voluntarily . 
It is worth reiterating that this type of restructur-
ing regime could not be implemented immedi-
ately . While it would constitute a stabilizing and 
disciplining mechanism in the long run, it would 
be highly destabilizing if implemented while debt 
levels are still very elevated . The section on dealing 
with legacy debt addresses the problem of tran-
sition to the long-run equilibrium and discusses 
various options on this path . 
Dealing with Holdouts in the Euro 
Area
To immunize restructuring against holdouts, the 
2012 Treaty Establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism would be amended as follows:
ARTICLE __: Immunity from judicial process
The assets and revenue streams of an ESM Member 
receiving stability support under this Treaty which 
are held in, originate from, or pass through the ju-
risdiction of an ESM Member shall not be subject 
to any form of attachment, garnishment, execution, 
injunctive relief, or similar forms of judicial process, 
in connection with a claim based on or arising out 
of a debt instrument that was eligible to participate 
in a restructuring of the debt of the beneficiary ESM 
Member after the effective date of this Treaty.
The immunities provided in the preceding para-
graph shall automatically expire when all amounts 
due to the ESM from the beneficiary ESM Member 
have been repaid in full.
An amendment of the ESM treaty for this purpose 
would become effective within the jurisdiction of 
each of the euro area countries . The potency of the 
measure would obviously be enhanced if other EU 
members, particularly the United Kingdom, were 
to enact comparable immunities in their domestic 
law . A country such as the United Kingdom might 
for selfish reasons wish to incorporate such immu-
nities into its own law; failure to do so could drive 
financial transactions away from London .
The justification for such an amendment of the 
ESM treaty from the perspective of the ESM and 
its members is self-evident and compelling . ESM 
member states will be lending taxpayer resources 
into a recipient country . If a restructuring of pri-
vate sector claims is deemed essential to restore 
that country to a sustainable position, the mem-
bers funding that bailout should not wish to see 
the assets and revenue streams of the recipient 
sovereign being seized by creditors that elect not 
to participate in the restructuring . Every €1 that 
is so seized and applied toward the immediate re-
payment of such a claim will logically require a 
corresponding €1 increase in the amount of ESM 
bailout assistance . ESM members have a legitimate 
interest in minimizing such transfers .
The foregoing is also consistent with the goal ex-
pressed in the preamble of the ESM that its funding 
to a distressed euro area member nation will re-
ceive priority over payments owed to private cred-
itors . To the extent that ESM funds can be seized 
by private creditors that have refused to participate 
in the restructuring, those private creditors have 
effectively reversed the priority order (after all, 
they are getting paid and exiting, while the ESM 
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is left holding the bag) .41 The modification that we 
propose will help ensure that the ESM funding re-
ceives its promised priority . 
Two precedents for this sort of mechanism are de-
scribed in box 4 .
An amendment of the ESM treaty along the lines 
suggested above would, together with the other 
measures already taken within the euro area, sub-
stantially replicate the key features of most corpo-
rate insolvency regimes . Supermajority creditor 
control of a debt workout would occur by requir-
ing the agreement of 75 percent of bondholders as 
a condition for ESM endorsement—defined across 
all bonds, in line with the aggregate threshold en-
visaged in the collective action clauses of all euro 
area sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013 . 
box 4. precedents For treaty-based mechanisms to immunize certain payment streams
The first precedent is relatively recent and directly on point . In May 2003, following the coalition inva-
sion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 
1483 (May 22, 2003) .42 Among other things, that resolution encouraged the new government in Iraq 
to restructure the roughly $140 billion debt stock that Saddam had accumulated during his tenure . In 
the context of “the desirability of prompt completion of the restructuring of Iraq’s debt,” the resolution 
immunized all the petroleum assets of Iraq against “any form of attachment, garnishment, or execu-
tion,” and clothed the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales (along with the bank account into which the proceeds 
of all such oil sales were to be directed) with privileges and immunities identical to those enjoyed by 
the United Nations itself .
Resolution 1483 was enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations . It was 
therefore binding on all members of the organization, and the resolution instructs each member state 
to “take any steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal systems to assure this 
protection” of Iraqi oil and financial assets . These UNSC-mandated immunities were periodically re-
newed and eventually expired on June 30, 2011 .43 In Europe, the immunities for Iraqi assets were im-
plemented through EU Regulation 1210/2003 (July 7, 2003) and amended from time to time thereafter 
in response to UNSC resolutions .44
It worked . In late 2004, Iraq negotiated an 80 percent nominal write-off of its debt owed to Paris Club 
countries and a long-term restructuring of the balance of the claims . This translated into an 89 .75 per-
cent reduction in the net present value of those claims . That same net-present-value haircut was then 
offered to the holders of roughly $21 billion of Saddam-era debt owed to private sector creditors, and 
virtually all those holders accepted it . The UNSC-mandated immunization of Iraqi assets undoubtedly 
helped to dampen any hope that a better recovery could be achieved at the sharp end of a litigation .
41  The Austrian Ministry of Finance has a question-and-answer discussion regarding the ESM on its Web site . Contained in the Q&A are a couple 
of questions and answers that help illustrate the point made in the text . On page 14, the question asked is: “Are only speculators going to be 
rescued? .” In responding no, the document explains that “if [the] ability [to repay the ESM funding] is not already shown at the outset, then 
initially, financial investors will have to waive receivables in the course of debt adjustment proceedings before any aid funding can flow .” On 
page 15, the question is “Has there been an infringement of Article 125 TFEU—the “no bailout” clause?” In responding no, the document 
explains that “where repayment is at risk, the restructuring clause for private investors will be triggered, because the ESM has priority over 
private creditors .” See BMF Ministry of Finance, Q&A European Stability Mechanism, http://english .bmf .gv .at/Allgemeines/FlashContent/
QAEuropeanStability_963/Q_A_European_Stability_Mechanism_(ESM) .pdf .
42 See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1483, http://www .un .org/ga/search/view_doc .asp?symbol=S/RES/1483%282003%29 .
43 See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1956, http://www .un .org/ga/search/view_doc .asp?symbol=S/RES/1956%282010%29 .
44 See http://eur-lex .europa .eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ .do?uri=OJ:L:2003:169:0006:0023:En:PDF .
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Although there would be no “automatic stay” pre-
venting the initiation of creditor lawsuits against 
the sovereign debtor, the amendment to the Trea-
ty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
proposed above would effectively shield the debtor 
country’s euro-area-based assets from compulsory 
seizure by holdout creditors .
Dealing with the debt overhang from 
the present crisis in the Euro area
At mentioned above the provisions of the ES-
DRR—in particular, the binding debt thresholds—
are not designed as a solution for the present debt 
crisis . In the short run, this option could not be 
activated since it would trigger immediate insta-
bility . In fact, it would serve a stabilizing function 
only if all participating countries start out with a 
debt level well below the upper threshold . 
At the present juncture, the base case of transiting 
into a more stable long run in the euro area seems 
to rely primarily on improving the incentives and 
control mechanisms (six-pack, two-pack, Europe-
an semester, and other torture instruments) . The 
status quo does not provide for debt restructuring 
(beyond Greece) and does not foresee any mutual-
ization of debt . It relies on the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) of the ECB, and beyond that 
it is based on the hope that the adjustment process 
and the structural reforms that debtor countries are 
undergoing will eventually bring rewards in terms 
of higher growth . The present strategy of dealing 
with the legacy debt is risky since it requires an ex-
tremely long and unilateral adjustment process on 
the side of the high-debt countries . It could easi-
ly derail for a number of reasons—for example, if 
growth fails to pick up for a few more years, if the 
credibility of the OMT fails or if the political will 
to drive reform is exhausted . 
The second precedent is from a half century ago, but is relevant in that it shows how a treaty regime can 
facilitate a restructuring by constraining the enforcement rights of certain problematic debt claims . 
In the period between 1924 and 1930, a number of German companies issued state-backed bonds in 
U .S . markets . Subsequently, before World War II, many of these bonds were reacquired by the issuers 
for retirement . These bonds, once reacquired, no longer represented valid obligations . However, because 
of the war, many of these reacquired bonds did not get canceled (the trustees or paying agents being 
generally located in New York) . Instead, the uncanceled bonds were held in bank vaults in Germany . In 
1945, at the end of the war, a large portion of these uncanceled bonds fell into the hands of the Soviet 
forces and were subsequently returned to circulation . When West Germany later sought to negotiate 
payments on its portion of the German defaulted debt from the prewar period, the question was how to 
distinguish between the authentic outstanding bonds and the ones that had been looted in 1945 .45
To solve the problem, the United States and West Germany entered into a treaty on April 1, 1953, that 
decreed that the bonds in question would not be enforceable unless they had been first validated by a 
joint U .S .-German validation board .46 Further, the U .S . Securities and Exchange Commission issued 
a ruling that U .S . brokers and dealers were prohibited from trading in bonds that had not been vali-
dated .47 For over a half century now, this treaty mechanism has held up remarkably well in protecting 
against the claims on unvalidated bonds .
45  For a fuller description of the background, see Abrey v . Reusch, 153 F . Supp . 337 (S .D .N .Y . 1957); and Mortimer Off Shore Services Ltd v . 
Federal Republic of Germany 615 F . 3d 97 (2d Cir . 2009) . 
46  Certain Matters Arising from the Validation of German Dollar Bonds, U .S .–F .R .G ., April 1, 1953, 4 U .S .T . 886, T .I .A .S . No . 2794 (entered into 
force September 16, 1953) .
47 Rule X-1502-3, Adopted Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 .
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There are, however, alternative options for dealing 
with the legacy debt problem . The first option is 
a minimal one, while the other requires a grand 
bargain between euro area countries .
Restructure as Needed If Above the Upper 
Threshold. This option assumes that further re-
structuring of sovereign legacy debt (in particular, 
if there is no further debt mutualization) might be 
inevitable in some countries . It therefore attempts 
to provide minimal conditions for containing the 
cost of such a restructuring . In particular, a minor 
amendment of the EMS treaty would provide re-
structuring countries with immunity from judicial 
process (as described above) . Indeed, this immu-
nity could arguably be implemented through a de-
cision of the ESM Board of Directors, without any 
amendment to the treaty .48 
In addition, any ESM-sanctioned debt-restructur-
ing programs as a condition of financial support 
could be limited to countries with debt above the 
long-run upper threshold . The result would be to 
limit the range within which debt restructurings can 
be expected . While this option would make debt re-
structuring easier by making life more difficult for 
holdouts, it would do little to make restructuring 
more likely . The dominant incentives for debtor 
and creditors countries in the euro area would still 
be to procrastinate and gamble for resurrection, at 
least until an effective and durable firewall for other 
countries and for banking systems is in place . 
Debt Redemption Pact. One way of crossing the 
bridge between the short-run debt overhang and a 
long-run restructuring regime is a European Debt 
Redemption Pact, as proposed by the German 
Council of Economic Experts (2011, 2012) . This 
proposal entails a temporary pooling of sover-
eign debt above 60 percent (of nonprogram coun-
tries) and a gradual redemption over a period of 
25 years .49 It would take countries about 5 years to 
gradually build up the common fund, which would 
at peak amount to about €2 .3 trillion (the largest 
contributors would be Italy, Germany and France) . 
With reasonable assumptions about growth, inter-
est rates and primary surpluses, countries would 
be able to redeem their respective debts over the 
following 20 years . The “own” debt level would be 
down to 60 percent after five years; therefore, in 
principle, the ESDRR regime could become bind-
ing after that . This option avoids restructuring leg-
acy debt, but it also requires significant political 
will and a long time commitment from the major 
euro area countries . Part of the deal would have 
to be a substantial strengthening of fiscal controls 
(e .g ., by agreeing on a specific tax that would au-
tomatically increase in case the country falls short 
of the committed reform path) . Also, there would 
have to be institutional mechanisms to ensure 
that mutualizing legacy debt would not reoccur . It 
would be a grand deal to secure the transition to 
a permanent sovereign debt restructuring regime 
that effectively harnesses market discipline . 
Summary of Proposals 
The summary table below gives an overview and 
comparison of our different proposals to organize 
orderly sovereign bankruptcy . The table is orga-
48  According to the preamble of the ESM treaty, ESM funding is to carry preferred creditor status . At the same time, the treaty lacks a mechanism 
that implements that preferred creditor status . Article 5(7)(n), however, gives the Board of Directors the power to take “any other necessary 
decision not explicitly provided for by this Treaty .” 
49  The focus of this section is to discuss transitional arrangements that would the euro zone to get from here the status quo (debt above thresholds 
and no restructuring regime) to there the proposed long run regime (debt below thresholds and a credible restructuring regime) . There are 
other proposals with involving partial mutualization that are were designed as permanent features of the euro zone rather than transitory 
arrangements . E .g ., these include the blue bond proposal by von Weizsäcker and Delpla (2010), which can be viewed as an alternative 
restructuring regime that excludes restructurings below 60 percent debt level (the amount of mutually issued blue bonds); Hellwig and 
Philippon (2011) propose mutualizing short-term debt, only in order to solve the problem of bond runs . Finally, the European Safe Bonds 
proposal by Brunnermeier et al . (2011) provides a solution to the safe asset problem, without mutualization, As an element of the European 
financial architecture, it would be consistent with the proposals made in this report, but it does not fix a debt reduction path . The proposal 
was not aimed at and as such does not describing a transition path to a restructuring regime with debt thresholds . Nevertheless, it might be a 
complement to a debt redemption pact, i .e ., a permanent solution to providing a safe asset .
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nized in an ascending manner: moving to the right 
means applying stronger medicine, and deploying 
more political capital, but also moving consider-
ably closer to solving the various incentive prob-
lems that mar sovereign debt markets . 
At the one end of the spectrum is the status quo, 
which we argue should be reformed urgently be-
cause it provides poor incentives both ex ante and 
ex post . The success of holdouts on Argentina and 
Greece gives a boost to the business model of dis-
tressed debt funds specialized in litigation . They 
play a redistribution game, benefiting at the cost 
other private and official creditors, but by the same 
token making restructuring more difficult and de-
layed . 
The minimum reform at the international lev-
el would therefore aim at preventing holdouts by 
adopting stronger collective action clauses that 
operate across all new debt contracts, giving a su-
permajority among all bondholders the right to 
restructure against the will of a minority (in the 
aggregate, and regardless of the votes of individu-
al bond series), as long as the restructuring leads 
to bondholders identical payment terms for all 
bondholders . This would constitute a significant 
improvement over the status quo . But the strength 
of this instrument—even for the narrow purpose 
of preventing holdouts—would depend on the de-
gree and speed of adoption of strong aggregation 
clauses in international debt contracts . 
An alternative—and possibly complementary—
approach that would “defang” holdouts immedi-
ately would require changes in laws or regulations 
in the major financial centers in order to immunize 
payments and clearing systems against attempts to 
attach payments . This would imply, in particular, 
that holdouts would find it harder to interfere with 
the debt service payments of debtors to creditors 
that have agreed to a sovereign debt restructuring . 
It is still a minimal proposal, however, because it 
does not address poor incentives in the run-up to 
a restructuring . 
The next proposal does address both ex-ante and 
ex-post distortions through a new sovereign debt 
adjustment facility, the SDAF of the IMF . Coun-
tries would have access to the SDAF (and only ac-
cess to the SDAF, among IMF facilities) in a situa-
tion where debt sustainability is no longer assured 
without substantial debt relief . The SDAF would 
thus establish a commitment device that would 
preclude the Fund from financing countries with 
doubtful debt sustainability . A minor amendment 
of the IMFs Articles of Agreement could provide 
instant and global protection of payments on re-
structured debt holders that had participated in 
an SDAF-sponsored restructuring . Because access 
to the SDAF would depend on ex-ante criteria—
as well as, of course, a debtor country’s request—
this proposal would have a significant impact on 
ex-ante incentives, making it more likely that un-
sustainable debt situations would be recognized in 
a timely way, and that debt restructurings would 
restore sustainability . 
The most far-reaching proposal in this report is 
the creation of a European Sovereign Debt Re-
structuring Regime . As discussed above, the euro 
area has both the largest need and the best chanc-
es to implement such as comprehensive solution . 
We propose implementing the regime through an 
amendment of the ESM treaty that defines condi-
tions under which the ESM is allowed to lend only 
if the member country also restructures its debt, 
and that gives guidelines as to the minimal amount 
of restructuring . The treaty change would also 
make the assets and payments of euro area mem-
ber that have undertaken an ESM-sanctioned re-
structuring immune from attachment by holdouts . 
The restructuring regime would tie into the Euro-
pean fiscal framework by using the 60 percent debt 
level as a threshold for conditioning official crisis 
lending . At debt levels below 60 percent, ESM 
lending would be largely unconditional; but at 60 
percent plus x (an upper threshold), ESM lending 
would be conditional on debt restructuring . The 
effect would be to limit the range within which the 
official sector can gamble for resurrection and cre-
ate moral hazard for debtors and private creditors, 
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while at the same time providing enough flexibility 
to accommodate large economic shocks . To be ef-
fective in credibly binding the hands of the ESM, 
access to IMF lending would have to be ruled out 
as a way of circumventing ESM conditionality (e .g ., 
by pooling euro area membership at the Fund) . By 
construction, the ESDRR would be binding for the 
countries of the euro area (since they are members 
of the ESM treaty); however, other EU member 
countries might be able to join voluntarily . 
The ESDRR could obviously not be implemented 
immediately because it would be highly disruptive 
during the current ongoing crisis . But it would be a 
crucial stabilizing and disciplining mechanism in 
the long-run European architecture . In the short 
run, the challenge remains to design mechanisms 
that bring down debt levels quickly and smoothly 
while at the same time not compromising incen-
tives for the long run .
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